

“OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE.”

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“Reddite depositum; pietas sua fœdera servet,
Trans absit; vacuas cœdis habete manus”—OVID.

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“He who would rightly appreciate the worth of personal independence as an element of happiness, should consider the value he himself puts upon it as an ingredient of his own. There is no subject on which there is a greater habitual difference of judgment between a man judging for himself, and the same man judging for other people. When he hears others complaining that they are not allowed freedom of action,—that their own will has not sufficient influence in the regulation of their affairs—his inclination is to ask, what are their grievances? what positive damage they sustain? and in what respect they consider their affairs to be mismanaged? and if they fail to make out, in answer to these questions, what appears to him a sufficient case, he turns a deaf ear, and regards their complaint as the fanciful querulousness of people whom nothing reasonable will satisfy. But he has quite a different standard of judgment when he is deciding for himself. Then, the most unexceptionable administration of his interests by a tutor set over him, does not satisfy his feelings: his personal exclusion from the deciding authority appears itself the greatest grievance of all, rendering it superfluous even to enter into the question of mismanagement. It is the same with nations. What citizen of a free country would listen to any offers of good and skilful administration, in return for the abdication of freedom? Even if he could believe that good and skilful administration can exist among a people ruled by a will not their own, would not the consciousness of working out their own destiny under their own moral responsibility be a compensation to his feelings for great rudeness and imperfection in the details of public affairs?”—J. S. MILL, *The Subjection of Women*, pp. 179, 180.

PREFACE.

IN my last revision of these pages I have been troubled by an unpleasant doubt whether, with regard to the Imperial mission of Great Britain in India, they might not, in some degree, and to some readers, convey a less grateful sense of past achievements, less hopeful views of future work, than would be truly consonant with my own feelings. I am desirous, therefore, of repeating here, in words that were published six years ago, that it is not because we have done so little, but because we have done so much, that I wish to see our work in India consolidated and naturalised. I can see no promise or hope of permanence anywhere but in the reformed Native State. *That*, and not the model British Province, is the mature and wholesome fruit of Imperial cultivation.

“It is a striking fact, that the satisfactions and mortifications of personal pride, though all in all to most men when the case is their own, have less allowance made for them in the case of other people, and are less listened to as a ground or justification of conduct, than any other natural human feelings; perhaps because men compliment them in their own case with the names of so many other qualities, that they are seldom conscious how mighty an influence these feelings exercise in their own lives.”—J. S. MILL, *The Subjection of Women*, p. 181.

“OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE.”

DURING the Session of 1869 both Houses of Parliament devoted some hours to India. Our recent policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia was brought before the Lords on the 19th of April. The same topic was entertained in the House of Commons on the 9th of July. On the 23rd of that month the Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State for India, addressed the Peers on the subject of Indian finance, confining himself entirely to receipts and disbursements, and schemes of railway extension.

In the House of Commons Mr. Grant Duff, the Under-Secretary of State, made the annual statement of the affairs of “our great Vassal Empire” at the afternoon sitting of the 3rd, and the adjourned debate was concluded on the night of the 5th of August.

On the former of these two days, Mr. R. W. Crawford, Member for the City of London and Chairman of the East Indian Railway Company, advocated the guaranty system under which the existing lines of railroad had been constructed in India; deprecated export duties on raw produce; suggested some improvements in the telegraph service, and proposed the consolidation of several small loans into one large stock.

Sir Stafford Northcote, Member for North Devon and Secretary of State for India in the late Conservative Ministry, recommended strict economy in the finances; and doubted whether the Public Works Department was in a proper state to undertake the construction of railways.

Sir Charles Wingfield, Member for Gravesend and

late Chief Commissioner of Oude, advised that all expenditure, except that which was extraordinary or strictly reproductive, should be met by income; believed that the outlay on barracks in the last ten years had been "a frightful drain on the resources of India;" insisted strongly on the separation of executive and judicial functions, for "such a multiplicity of duties were now thrown upon a Collector that it was impossible he could get through them all except by devolving the larger share of the duties upon his assistants," and "with a view of ascertaining the opinions and feelings of the Natives, and bringing these into harmony with the acts of our officials, weighed down as they were by their various duties," recommended the establishment of "consultative Native Councils."

Mr. Fowler of Penryn and Sir Wilfred Lawson of Carlisle, two Members honourably noted for their attention to matters of general philanthropy and national morality, denounced the opium traffic, on which one sixth of the Indian revenue depends.

Colonel Sykes, Member for Aberdeen, felt convinced that the income of India was amply sufficient to meet any calls that might be made on it.

After the adjournment, Sir Stafford Northcote having moved for some correspondence on the subject of the extension of railways in India, Mr. Graves, the Member for Liverpool, suggested that a map should be added to the return, and "regretted to see that some of those works would not be executed till 1890 or even 1900, and, if that were so, the construction of railways would be entirely inadequate to the wants of India or of this country. "Another important point," continued Mr. Graves, "was the construction of the Council of India. If more sympathy were shown for commerce in that body, there would be a more prompt extension of the railway system. He thought there should be a larger mercantile element in the Council. The railway system of India was not a mere Indian question. For many years we should have to look to India for cotton, and every mile of railway opened there tapped new sources of production."

The adjourned debate on the evening of the 5th. of August enabled Mr. J. B. Smith, Member for Stockport, Mr. Bazley of Manchester, and Mr. Platt of Oldham, to demand greater facilities for the supply of cotton, and for conveying that staple to the coast.

Mr. C. B. Denison, Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service, apologised for the opium revenue; desired more detailed explanations as to the expenditure on Public Works, the post, the telegraph, and the manufacture of small arms, and supported Mr. Crawford's views as to the guaranty system of constructing railways.

Sir David Wedderburn, Member for Ayrshire, proposed certain measures for promoting the health and comfort of the British army on Indian service.

All this was very well. If more railroads are wanted they had better be made and worked on the most economical and efficient principles,—on some plan very different from that which has been hitherto pursued. It is highly desirable that there should be a constant and cheap supply of cotton. Of course if sixty-five thousand British troops are to be maintained in India they must be properly housed: the only question is—and here Sir Charles Wingfield again hit a blot—whether fifteen millions sterling have been judiciously expended on solid and permanent barracks during the last ten years; whether our soldiers are not more healthy and comfortable in less costly lodgings;* whether on military, political, and financial considerations, they might not be more effectively distributed and occupied in a rotation of cantonments and in moveable camps of exercise.†

Barrack accommodation, the supply of small arms, the Post, the Electric Telegraph, the Public Works,—all these were by no means inappropriate subjects of inquiry and remark, though scarcely worthy to have formed the chief topics of discussion. The annual inquisition of the House of Commons might well have been directed less to administrative merits and defects, than to those broader and more general principles of Government, which

* Appendix A.

† Appendix B.

must not only control the action of every department in India, but affect the course, character, and credit of the British Empire throughout the world.

On the whole, the debates in both Houses were distinguished by an equal dearth of reference to the tribes and nations of India, their political and social condition, and a similar adherence to home interests and departmental criticism. They contained marvellously little mention of the people, or of the only organised communities in which popular feelings and opinions can be fairly ascertained, and in which the durable results of British tutelage can be correctly estimated—the Native States.

The peculiarly material, mechanical and selfish considerations pervading the debate, seem to have struck in their full force one Member of long standing, much respected in the House and the country, not as a leader of party or as an eminent orator, but because—like Sir Wilfred Lawson and Mr. Fowler, whom he supported in their attack upon the opium revenue,—he is one of those men over whom the moral and religious aspects of a question are always seen to exercise an irresistible attraction. The Hon. Arthur Kinnaird, Member for Perth, said :—

“ The people of India might suppose from this discussion that in the House of Commons India was looked upon either as a Manchester colony or a military settlement. Was India to be governed for her own welfare or for the sake of Manchester? No doubt cotton was a good thing, and honourable gentlemen of one idea thought that India was made for the purpose of receiving Manchester goods. But he did not see it. He felt some sympathy for the Natives of India.”

The collective temper and demeanour of the House of Commons, towards India, during the past Session, can only be adequately described as apathetic and negligent. When the Under Secretary of State commenced speaking on the 3rd of August—the regular annual opportunity for a discussion on Indian affairs—there were about thirty-five Members present, which number swelled to a maximum of fifty-five by the time he had got half way through his speech, but dwindled away towards the close to about forty, among whom was not one occupant

of the Treasury Bench. No recognised leader, no ex-Cabinet Minister, from either side of the House, except Sir Stafford Northcote, took any part in the debate. Yet the scanty attendance on the 3rd of August is said to have constituted "the best Indian Budget house ever known."

India is not governed by the British Parliament.

And it would appear as if the apathy of the House of Commons was a very fair measure of the apathy in the country. Indian affairs never once occupied the attention of either candidates or constituencies at the General Election of 1868. No pledges were exacted or offered on any subject connected with India. I can trace no manifestation of political activity relating to India in any part of the United Kingdom, during the year 1869, except the proceedings of the Cotton Supply Association.

The only events, the only projects, the only measures, affecting, or likely to affect the people of India, that seem capable of exciting any interest or discussion at home, in or out of Parliament, are those concerning the supply of cotton and the extension of railways, for the benefit of British commerce and manufactures.

India is not governed by the British nation. *

It may be said, it has been said, especially by Englishmen engaged in the public service of India, that this is all just as it should be,—that India ought to be governed in India; that even the control of the Secretary of State and his Council should be nothing more than formal supervision; that Parliamentary dictation is particularly objectionable; that although the British public cannot invest too much capital in the Indian funds, in railways, and other works of utility, their inquiries and interference should be strictly limited to the disposal and security of their investments,—a field of inquiry sufficiently wide after all to include all that was to be excluded,—and that no irresponsible persons, unqualified by local observation and experience, ought to meddle with the politics of India.

It is not by acquiescing in monstrous claims of this description, advanced by professional administrators, that the people of Great Britain can shake off their national respon-

sibility for the defects, if there be any, in the Imperial rule of India, or gain absolution from the consequences of such defects.

The error that has chiefly led to these claims, and to the too frequent acquiescence in them, is that of supposing *government* and *administration* to be identical and convertible terms. Good administration and good government are very different things, and by no means necessarily co-exist.

If we institute an analogy which may some day be found to be not unscientific, and compare a State with an individual, *government* may be said to be its *constitution*, that more or less perfect co-ordination of all the animal, moral and intellectual energies, under the guidance of a central organ, upon which, in a community as in a person, depends healthy and harmonious life. *Administration* would then correspond with that daily course of nutrition, clothing, ablution, and exercise, by which the wants of the organism are supplied. If the person, or the State, enjoys a good constitution, the means and appliances for administering to its material wants may be very rude, rough, and scanty, and yet life may be vigorous and its work well performed. On the other hand, no amount of careful administration—however lavish the provision, however exquisite the apparatus—can rectify a constitution that is inherently bad, or spoiled by long abuse. If some energies are greatly in excess, and others quite deficient, if some faculties have been over-cultivated, and others utterly suppressed, if a limb or muscle has been too long in unnatural repose, or dependent on foreign support,—harmony will not be restored to the unbalanced functions by merely palliative measures: there must be a constitutional change, a reform in the Government.

“They manage these matters better in France”, is still true to a very considerable extent. In many departments of the public service France is more skilfully and more frugally administered than Great Britain, but she is assuredly not so well governed. She may be tended and supplied more regularly and systematically, but her constitution is not so good. Some of her functions may pro-

ceed with greater energy, but their aggregate is not so harmonious, nor is the central organ so sound as ours. She is liable to dangerous convulsions and hemorrhage on the slightest change of regimen. She cannot assimilate reforms as we do.

There might be many gradations of praise and blame before the administration of a country could be fairly pronounced as good, or its government as bad, as they were in the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom under Austrian rule. In all probability no provinces of Italy, at any period, were so carefully and conscientiously administered. The Italians were not excluded from office; there were no religious differences; the system was, above all, untainted by that scornful prejudice against everything Native, engendered by the premature authority and anti-social relations of Anglo-Indian officialism. From 1815 to 1859 the Austrian administration of Northern Italy steadily improved; the government steadily deteriorated and became more difficult, until latterly it became impossible, except at the point of the bayonet.

It may be that great benefits would be conferred on several disorderly and distracted States,—Mexico, for example, or Greece,—if they could be subjected for a few years to the coercive management of Great Britain or France. It may be disputed whether, since her independence of Turkey, the progress of Greece has been delayed by too much foreign interference or by too little. It may be open to question whether Mexico would not be likely to settle down more quickly and decisively, after staggering and struggling through a period of confusion under her own leaders, than after undergoing the process of foreign discipline. These are matters of speculation; but it will hardly be denied or doubted that by extraordinary sacrifices and exertions on the part of the more civilised State, order might be imposed on the less advanced nation,—life and property rendered secure, commerce protected and contracts enforced. But with the establishment of a regular administration the difficulties of government are sure to be redoubled. However enlightened and disinterested may have been the original intention, as the

term of guardianship is prolonged, its provocations and temptations almost of necessity increase. The thankless and burdensome nature of the task, on the one side, the loss and humiliation on the other, become every day more and more apparent, and are more and more sensibly felt, as the active work of organisation subsides into tranquil management. The patient, restored to consciousness and strength, expects to be relieved from restraint, requires exercise and amusement, and wishes once more to direct his own affairs in his own way. Grateful at first, perhaps, to his foreign doctors and nurses, he now resents their control, and begins to doubt their motives. Those motives have actually no tendency to improve,—they tend rather to deteriorate as the curative process is protracted. If the practice has proved lucrative, the physician is averse to lose it; if it has been unprofitable, he requires some compensating advantage.

We have had some experience of this treatment, and of the patient's feelings towards us, on a small and unimportant scale, in the Ionian Islands, now happily off our hands, just as their government, except by military force, was becoming impossible. On the great continent of India,—not able, or ready, or fit to be off our hands, but not more vitally attached to us than the Ionian Islands,—too long a course of the same treatment, in its most depressing form, over an ever widening area, has generated the same feelings in the heart and brain of its vast and various population, and threatens to render its government incalculably more difficult. Divided and diffident as it may be, ignorant and indifferent as it may seem, that vast population is not an inorganic or insensible mass.

The political diagnosis of India has been misunderstood, because no distinction has been drawn between her constitution and her daily functions,—between government and administration.

The true government of every realm, great or small, may be said to be carried on in two distinct spheres, that of the Sword, or military force, and that of the Sceptre, or civil authority. There can be no doubt or question of our occupying the former sphere in India more fully and

firmly than ever. Against external and internal assailants we are armed at all points. But military force can only deal with open assailants, and cannot be everywhere present and prepared. At a period of great national excitement or distress, the efforts of secret conspiracy and passive resistance, might cause enormous loss, expense, and terror, while military operations were yet aimless and impracticable. Civil authority and social influence can alone avail for the repression of unseen discontent and growing disaffection. From the Viceroy downwards our officials exercise no direct social influence, and no civil authority—unsupported by British bayonets,—over those leading and representative classes whose sentiments and movements determine those of the population at large, and whose disaffection and discontent must ever be obstructive and dangerous. Indirectly and intermediately, no doubt,—especially in the Native States,—our views are, to some extent, interpreted and our objects promoted, by the persuasion and example of those whom the people respect and trust.

Although we are not as yet quite face to face with the brutal appetites and wild fanaticism of all India,—although many centres of conservatism and intercommunication have been happily still preserved,—the general tendency of our rule, excessively developed between 1848 and 1856, has been to weaken all civil authority apart from officialism, to destroy our friends and multiply our mercenaries, to reject free co-operation and insist upon monotonous conformity. And thus we have allowed the Imperial Sceptre to be laid aside, and have come to rely more and more exclusively upon the Imperial Sword. We have declined all assistance; we have despised all proffered services; we have destroyed many little Sceptres, and done our best to break every little Sword.

The Marquis Wellesley's policy of inducing Native Princes to allow our troops, paid by tribute or cession of territory, to be substituted for their own, was ingenious and intelligible, at least as a policy of transition. Many Native States then maintained formidable forces, chiefly disciplined and officered by Frenchmen, with whose na-

tion we were at war. Under Lord Wellesley's treaties some of these Native armies were considerably reduced in numerical strength, and their foreign officers were discharged; while our brigades, placed in advantageous positions, overlooked the whole field, and checked the few remaining States not included in the Subsidiary system.

The victories and treaties of 1803 and 1805, completed by the campaigns and negotiations of the Marquis of Hastings between 1817 and 1820, made the British Government, with one apparent exception, the only military Power, and virtually if not formally the Imperial Head, among all the States of India. The army of Scindia, the Maharajah of Gwalior, the last shadow of a substantive military Power in Hindostan, was dispersed in the one day's campaign of 1843.

But Lord Dalhousie caricatured the policy of Lord Wellesley when he applied the same set of terms to the subordinate and submissive States of Sattara and Nagpore, spoke of them as "obstacles to safe communication and combined military movement", and declared that their annexation would "consolidate our military strength", and "absorb separate military Powers".* They were not "military Powers", and they were not "separate" from their acknowledged superior. The military force kept up by these and most other Native States, was so small as to be nothing more than a demonstration of moral force in favour of the British Government, and always at its disposal. During the momentous crisis of 1857 the Irregular Cavalry which the extinct States of Sattara and Nagpore were bound by treaty to furnish,† would have done more, with the Princes themselves or some of their nearest relatives at their head, to keep order in the Mahratta country, Bundelcund, and the Central Provinces, and generally to prevent insurrection from spreading, than could have been done by double the number of the finest British troops.

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83, *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, pp. 35, 36.

† *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864 (Longmans and Co.), vol. iii, p. 124; vol. vi, p. 8.

Even the hungry and ragged levies of Oude and Hyderabad, though large in numbers,—and larger still if their muster-roll was to be believed,—were never dangerous or menacing to our supremacy, and could have been easily reduced, if we had undertaken in good earnest the administrative reform of those States. But it was the main principle of Lord Dalhousie's policy that the friendly tuition and reform of a dependent State was imprudent and unprofitable. There can be no doubt that he thought the annexation of Oude, as he had said of the annexation of Nagpore and Sattara, would “consolidate our military strength”, and “absorb a separate military Power”.* What was the result? What is the actual consequence after the lapse of thirteen years?

There was not a single British soldier in the Kingdom of Oude from 1846 to 1856, when it was annexed, including the period of our Sutlej and Punjaub wars, when every man was urgently required. We have now in Oude one Regiment of Dragoons, five Batteries of Artillery and four Battalions of Foot, at an annual cost of upwards of £600,000, two-thirds of the net revenue of the Province. If we add the annual charges of the Staff, the Native troops (four Regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry), and of the Police, we shall find nearly the whole revenue swallowed up in paying for an armed force to keep the country quiet. Before the annexation in 1856 the unreformed Government of Oude, with an imbecile King at its head, managed to preserve order, and play the part of a good neighbour, with no assistance from us beyond one Company of Native Artillery and three Sepoy Battalions. This is the way we “have consolidated our military strength”, and “added to the resources of the public treasury”.

The Rajah of Nagpore paid us an annual tribute of £80,000, one-fifth of the revenue of his dominions, and maintained a thousand of “the best description of Irregular Horse,” “to serve with the British army in the field.”†

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83; *Rajah of Berar, Papers*, 1854, pp. 35, 36.

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. iii, p. 124.

Now we have lost the tribute, and something more—for the Nagpore Provinces, without anything being charged for the troops quartered within them, have never paid their own expenses,—and we have lost the services of a thousand Horse. But we have lost much more than the tribute and the Horse, we have lost the moral authority and influence of the Rajah and his Government. Wherever a centre of conservative interests and political subordination, such as the Court of Nagpore, Sattara, Jhansi, or Lucknow, is broken up, moral force is destroyed, and our own military force must supply its place.

Nor can any one avoid joining issue on this point by declaiming on the alleged misrule of some of these States, or the extravagance and self-indulgence of their Princes, for which, it may be said, annexation was the only feasible remedy. That plea was utterly erroneous then,—it would be flagrantly false now. It was not a plea upon which Lord Dalhousie relied. He objected to the tuition and reform of Native States, not so much because it would not be beneficial to them as because it would not, as he supposed, be profitable to ourselves. One of his avowed reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the rebellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised “aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore State, during the minority of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing;”^{*} was that “we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they were actually made our own; *while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession.*”[†]

The expected “increase of revenue” from the Punjaub, which was bound by treaty to pay, and was well able to pay, an annual subsidy of £220,000 so long as our troops remained in the country,[‡] has been converted into a steady drain of about two millions per annum, undiminished to this day, from the Imperial resources of India.

In the same manner he recommended the annexation

^{*} *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, vol. ii, p. 267.

[†] *Punjaub Papers*, 1849, p. 663.

[‡] *Collection of Treaties*, vol. ii, p. 269.

of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee by refusing to recognise an adoption, because we should otherwise "for many years to come have to bear the labour of governing this State, employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for the purpose," and at the end of the young Prince's minority have to "hand over the country with its revenue of four lacks of rupees."*

And when in 1851 he was urged by General J. S. Fraser, the able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, with all the weight of many years' experience in that important post, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's policy. "If," he said, "provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall on the British agent, by whom the Native ministry is controlled. The agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without undivided authority."†

General Sir William Sleeman, Resident at Lucknow from 1849 to 1854, during those six years pressed upon the Government of India his detailed plans for reforming the administration of Oude, and pledged his great reputation for the success of the experiment. He looked in vain to Calcutta for sanction and support. His proposals were coldly and silently received. Lord Dalhousie did not want to reform Oude but to annex it, and pronounced in one of his consultative Minutes on the subject, that if the British Government undertook "the responsibility, the labour, and the risk," of reconstructing and reforming a Native State, it ought, "after providing for the pensioned dynasty, for the administration of the Province, and for its progressive improvement," to be allowed to appropriate the surplus revenue to Imperial purposes.‡ There has been no surplus revenue from Oude up to the present day. On the contrary, including the provision for

* *Papers, Kerowlee*, 1855, p. 9.

† *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 38.

‡ *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 190.

“the pensioned dynasty,” and the military expenses, the annual remittances from other treasuries to make up the cost of our administration cannot be less than £700,000. Without making any charge against Oude for extraordinary war expenditure during the Rebellion, what Lord Dalhousie called the “acknowledged possession” of this Province from 1856 to 1869, must have consumed at least eight millions sterling, which the Government of India has had to provide from the surplus revenues of Bengal and Madras.

Both Lord Dalhousie and one of his most able and distinguished Councillors, Sir John Peter Grant,* did incidentally, and as an additional argument, maintain the uselessness of temporary instruction and management, and set down badly governed Native States as “incurrible.” Yet the examples they adduced, if they had been carefully studied, would have been seen to be either inconclusive or adverse to their views. Even in 1855 there were ample data in the hands of Lord Dalhousie’s Government to prove that all the most recent efforts at reforming Native States had succeeded, while the contemporary annexations had failed to produce any profit. Scinde and the Punjaub between them had upset every calculation, and brought disorder and disaster into the finances of India. “We were not prepared,” the Court of Directors wrote in 1852, “to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain on the general revenues of India.”

On the other hand, wherever British instruction had been allowed a fair trial it had invariably wrought a marked improvement in the administration of Native States. The State of Nagpore, though treated with great neglect and indifference between 1829, when British management ceased, and 1854, when it was annexed,† never lost the benefit of the rules and habits instituted by Sir Richard Jenkins, so that during twenty-five years of purely Native administration, under an indolent and dissolute Rajah, our active and open interference was not once required, to

* Now Governor of Jamaica.

† See the opinions expressed by Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 17.

check oppression, to keep the peace, or to restore order. In 1847 Lord Hardinge, warning the King of Oude that his continued misrule would compel the Government of India to assume the temporary management of his country, held up the case of Nagpore before him at once as an example and an encouragement :—

“The Nagpore State, after having been restored to order by a British administration of the land revenue, is now carried on under Native management, with due regard to the rights of the Prince and the contentment of the people.”*

Even in his very unfavourable report, written after the Rajah's death, Mr. Mahsel, the last Resident at Nagpore, bore testimony to the permanent results of previous British instruction :—

“The revenue system of fixed leases left behind by Sir Richard Jenkins has, on the other hand, preserved the finances of the State and the agricultural interest from being sacrificed wholly to reckless folly or temporary expedients to raise funds.”†

And in a despatch dated the 10th of August 1868, Sir Richard Temple, then Resident at Hyderabad, who had recently been Commissioner of the Nagpore Provinces, wrote as follows :—

“I have on the whole a favourable opinion of the administration of the Nagpore country by the Mahratta Sovereigns of the Bhonsla House. There were many excellent points about their rule; but some of these were owing to the care of British officers, such as Sir Richard Jenkins, Colonel Wilkinson, and others.”‡

Some reforms in the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, commenced by Sir Charles Metcalfe as Resident in Hyderabad in 1821, and carried out by English Superintendents under his guidance, were quite successful; but, unfortunately, on the very first application of the youthful Sovereign, Nasir-ood-Dowla, who came to the throne in 1829, the wholesome supervision of the Resident and his assistants was discontinued, and the beneficial results of eight years' labour were almost entirely lost.

Lord Dalhousie adduced the two experiments of Hyder-

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 63, 64.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 16.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 69.

abad under Sir Charles Metcalfe, and of Nagpore under Sir Richard Jenkins, as instances of the total failure of temporary management,* whereas, if properly examined, they are seen to be instances of signal success, marred only by the premature relaxation and subsequent neglect, for which our Government was solely responsible.

British instruction had been eminently successful in Sattara,—so much so that, while arguing against the recognition of the second Rajah's adopted son, Lord Dalhousie admitted "the excellence" of the deceased Prince's "administration," declaring it to have been "conspicuous for wisdom and mildness,"† and only expressing a doubt whether this was not attributable rather to "the personal qualities of the Rajah" than to "the nature of the institutions of the State." But the State had been equally well governed by the first Rajah, whose rule was declared by the Court of Directors to be "a model to all Native Princes;"‡ and a great part of the credit which on this occasion Lord Dalhousie ascribed to a Hindoo Ruler, was certainly due to the careful tuition and control of Captain Grant Duff, the first Resident at Sattara, and to the institutions which he established.

Although in Lord Dalhousie's time the evidence from very recent experience ought to have been enough to demonstrate the financial failure of territorial extension and the practicability of reforming Native States, that evidence has become more clear and more abundant, in a very remarkable degree, during the last twelve years. The thriving condition and orderly administration of the important States of Gwalior under the Maharajah Jyajee Rao Scindia, and of Indore under the Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar,—both having been managed by British officers during the minority of those Princes,—of Travancore, the principal State under the Madras Government, and Kolapore, the chief Mahratta Principality within the Bombay Presidency,—both taken in hand at different periods in the midst of disorder and revolt, and reformed by British instruction and supervision,—have from various

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 186-7.

† *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 82.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1843, p. 1268.

causes become the subject of public notoriety within the last few years. In all these instances the good work was carried on and completed without the States being over-run and their revenues devoured by those costly establishments under highly salaried English officers, whose vested interests in Mysore almost procured the annexation of that Principality, and still impede its straightforward reorganisation as a self-acting Native State.

A Parliamentary Return of 1867 thus describes the results of British instruction and management in one of the States abovementioned, Kolapore.

“In the course of the year, the Governor of Bombay made a tour through the Southern Mahratta country, and at Kolapore he congratulated the Rajah in having proved himself worthy, after a long probation, to assume the direct government of his territories. Every department of the State was found to be well administered by his Highness in person, and there was every visible mark of justice being properly administered, and of the people being well governed, prosperous, and contented.”*

An examination of the series of *Reports of the Central India Political Agency* from 1865-6 to 1867-8 suggests forcibly that there are some depths in the social and administrative problems of Native States, some secrets in the statecraft of Native Sovereigns, which their appointed guides and teachers,—conscientious, energetic, and well-informed as they are,—have failed to fathom. A little more tolerance, a little more sympathy, a little more humility, might open those secrets and make those depths transparent. As it is, our Political Agents appear sometimes, and avow themselves to be, quite puzzled and bewildered to account for the fact that a system so irregular and so rude, when compared with ours, as that of a tolerably governed Native State, can work so well on the whole, and give occasion to so little complaint or perceptible discontent. In his Report dated the 1st of August, 1866, Colonel R. J. Meade, Agent to the Governor General for Central India, describes the administration of Indore by the Maharajah Holkar as “arbitrary and despotical in the fullest Eastern sense”—

* *Moral and Material Progress*, 1855-6, 1867, p 43

words which, unintentionally no doubt, suggest the bastinado and the bow-string. Yet, he continues,

“The marvel is that, under such a system, the administration of the State is carried on as well as is the case; and that it is so is mainly, in my opinion, due to the fact that the Chief, when roused, acts with undoubted energy; that he readily hears and inquires into complaints of corruption or oppression against his officials, and, when such are proved to his satisfaction, punishes the accused parties with the utmost severity. The dread thereby inspired amongst this class doubtless prevents the amount of aggravated mismanagement that would otherwise naturally occur; and to it may also, probably be ascribed the comparatively greater administrative activity of the District Officials of this State; while the Chief’s orders to his officers are, as a rule, unquestionably promptly attended to.”

Colonel Meade “regrets that the system in this State” is not “more in harmony with the known views of the British Government;” but, he adds, “though the State is not governed in the liberal and enlightened spirit that might perhaps reasonably be expected from a Ruler who was brought up under British guardianship, and had the advantage of receiving an English education, its administration is, on the whole, better supervised and conducted than that of most of the Native Chiefships with which I am acquainted.”

Thus, from what has been already cited, we may, I think, conclude that the State of Indore and the subjects of Holkar have derived great benefit, if not all “that might, perhaps, reasonably be expected,” from the “British guardianship” and “English education” enjoyed by their Prince in his youth. The following extracts from the same Report tend to confirm that conclusion:—

“Maharaja Holkar contributes handsomely towards the Malwa Dispensaries, and the Charitable Hospitals at the city of Indore and the Residency, which are maintained by his annual grant, and some other local subscriptions, on a very liberal and creditable scale, are of invaluable benefit to the poor of the town and neighbourhood.”*

In another part of the same Report the Agent laments that so “few of the Native Rulers have any just concep-

* *Central India Agency Report, 1865-6, Calcutta, 1867, p. 20, 21.*

tion of the advantages of education," while "some of them even regard its progress among their people as undesirable and objectionable," but

"The Maharajas of Gwalior and Indore both take an interest in this question; and the Madrissas" (colleges) "at their respective capitals are creditably maintained and well attended. That at Indore has turned out several pupils with an unusually good knowledge of English, and otherwise well educated, some of whom occupy important posts in the service of the State."

The College at Indore he describes as "a very creditable institution," and believes "it will improve under the direction of a new Master from the Poona College, who has lately joined it."*

Among the leading events of the year the Political Agent refers to the approaching termination of a new land settlement for a term of twenty-one years throughout the Indore territories, in which the Maharajah had been "engaged for the last eighteen months," and he fears that "there is a good deal of dissatisfaction amongst the people at the advanced rates to be imposed under this new settlement,"—"these rates being arbitrarily fixed according to the class of the land, and the cultivators having apparently little option allowed them as to their acceptance of them or not."† In the Report of the next year, however, the Agent candidly admits that further information had led him to modify the unfavourable opinion he had at first conceived with respect to the new settlement.

"His Highness was good enough some time ago to explain to me in detail the basis on which he is endeavouring to carry it out, and the reasons which he believed had caused it to be viewed with dissatisfaction; and in illustration of these points he went over with me the settlement papers of some three or four villages, which were drawn up most clearly and creditably, and which certainly quite bore out his statements."‡

The gist of the Maharajah's explanation was that the new settlement was based on a careful Survey of each village, which deprived many land-holders as well as the local officials of the illicit profits they had been deriving

* *Central India Report*, 1865-6, p. 8.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1866-7 (Calcutta, 1868), p. 7.

from unassessed land, now bought under assessment ; and that these influential persons had done their best to alarm the cultivators and to bring the measure into popular discredit. This is only what has notoriously occurred under our own Survey and Settlement operations in every part of India. The Agent adds :—

“ Maharajah Holkar has shown much readiness to hear and discuss personally with the Zemindars the representations urged on this subject, and His Highness has, in some cases, been induced thereby to authorise slight concessions being made to dissatisfied parties.”*

Another plea for an enhanced assessment is mentioned by the Political Agent very slightly, as if it were quite insufficient,—“the high prices of all agricultural produce;” yet the fact is undoubted, has raised wages throughout India, increased the profits of the agricultural classes, and increased the expenses of the public service. In all the recent settlements in the Bombay Presidency and in Mysore, the rise in prices has been taken as one element in calculating the new rates to be assessed. A Bombay paper just received states that “thirty years ago unhusked rice was sold at 12 to 13 rupees per khandi”† (500 lbs.) “in the Concan · about ten years later the price rose to from 18 to 20 rupees ; and during the last ten years it has been oscillating between 30 and 40 rupees.”‡

We learn from a recently printed Blue-Book that the gross revenue of the Nizam's Territories had risen from £1,163,850 in 1861-62 to £1,601,846 in 1865-66, about 37 per cent. in five years ; and the increase is chiefly accounted for by “the great rise in prices,” “allowing the cultivators to command much higher rates for their produce.” The increase in the land revenue is said to be “by no means proportionate to the increased means of the taxpayer.”§

Two subsequent short paragraphs in the *Central India Report* for 1866-7 seem to indicate a judicious and liberal

* *Central India Report*, 1866-7, p. 7.

† Often called *candy*.

‡ *Hindu Reformer*, Bombay, December 4th, 1869.

§ *Moral and Material Progress of India* in 1867-8, 1869, p. 114-15.

expenditure to some extent in departments hitherto neglected by too many Native Princes.

“Three new schools have been established by the State during the past year, one, a female school, at Indore, which is attended by forty-three girls.”

“The water-works and aqueduct for supplying the city of Indore were completed and opened during the past year.”*

In the *Central India Report* for 1867-8 we are told that the Rajah of the small State of Dhar, which was under British management during the Prince's minority, after its narrow escape from extinction,† “takes much interest in his schools, which he visits and examines every week,” also that the financial condition of the State is sound and satisfactory,” and that “the Chief has adopted the essential points of the British Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes as the guide for all the Courts in his State, and exhibits an intelligent interest in their working.”‡

It was of this little Principality that a most mischievous misleader of public opinion, the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times*, who for several years, both in that capacity and in his other character as Editor of the *Friend of India*, has kept up an incessant fire of slander and insult upon Native Princes and their administration, wrote in a letter dated the 10th of March, 1866, that “Lord Stanley's persistence in causing the restoration of Dhar *has reduced that State*” to “*a miserable condition.*”§

Sometimes, however, facts of a very different complexion, when officially attested, will find their way even into the *Friend of India*. An article published in January, 1870, gives some interesting information from the recently printed Administration Report of the Rohilla State of Rampore, containing a dense population of nearly half a million, on an area of 608,784 acres, of which, it is said, “the cultivation is of a higher order than in any of the adjoining British districts.”

* *Central India Report*, 1866-7, p. 7

† See *Dhar not Restored*, by John Dickinson (King, Parliament Street), 1864

‡ *Report*, 1867-8 (Calcutta, 1868), p. 18.

§ See Appendix C, “The Little State of Dhar”.

"The revenue last year was 13,00,380 Rs. (£130,038), and the expenditure 11,22,858 Rs. (£112,285), leaving a comfortable little surplus." "The Courts are modelled on the British system, an ultimate appeal lying in every case to the Nawab." "The Rampore jail is built on the plan of the Benares prison, and the convicts are employed in the manufacture of carpets." "Rampore has schools of Arabic, Persian, and English, to which students from Cabul, Kandahar, and even Bokhara resort for the study of Mahomedan divinity and law. It is pleasant to find female education thriving under the shadow of such severely orthodox institutions."

We are further informed that "the State has a little army 2,685 strong, which costs 271,692 Rs. (£27,169) a year," and the writer admits that "a 'crack' district officer would not be ashamed of the Nawab's management."*

Sir Donald Macleod, the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub, reporting on his tour of inspection in 1866 through the Native States of Puttiala, Nabha, Malair-Kotla and Kapoorthulla, writes as follows:—

"Notwithstanding the existence in some of these States of court intrigues and factions prejudicial to good government, his Honour was glad to perceive in most of them signs of substantial progress. In all of them an attempt has been made to assimilate the administrative system in some degree to that of the British Government. Regular settlements of land revenue have been introduced; the Indian Penal Code is adopted as the basis of their criminal law; and in most of them a system of Civil Procedure has been prescribed, more or less borrowed from the Punjaub Civil Code; while in all the capitals, and especially in those of Puttiala and Malair Kotla, are excellent schools, the scholars of which would not do discredit to the best schools of the adjoining districts of British territory."†

The same high authority, in a letter dated 5th September, 1867, again refers in the following terms to this brotherhood of Sikh Chieftains:—

"The principal Cis-Sutlej Chiefs and the Rajah of Kapoorthulla have made considerable progress of late years towards the adoption of more enlightened principles of government."‡

A very favourable account of the same region is given by

* Extracted from the *Homeward Mail* of February 5th, 1870.

† *Punjaub Report*, 1866-7 (printed at Lahore), paragraph 377, p. 123.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 113.

Sir Richard Temple, now a member of the Viceroy's Council, who served in the Punjaub for many years with great distinction, in a despatch dated the 16th of August, 1867, written when he was Resident at Hyderabad.

"From 1854 to 1860 I had particular knowledge of the protected Sikh States, Cis Sutlej. These are intertwined and interlaced amongst British districts supposed to be administered in our very best method." "The villages of the Puttiala and Jheend States especially were among the finest and happiest I have ever known, and seemed to be on a par with the choicest pieces of British territory.*

Major C. F. Prescott, a Commissioner of Survey and Settlement, replying to the circular from the Government of India dated the 1st of July, 1867, regarding the general feeling of the Natives towards British rule, naturally upholds the great advantages of our administration, magnifying especially his own office. And yet in the following extract he bears testimony to the readiness of Native Rulers to appropriate those parts of our administrative system that they see to be practicable and profitable, and that they know to be popular.

"The Survey settlement of this Presidency has conferred on the ryots a vast property in land, and given them a security of tenure they know they never would have obtained under Native rule. They, therefore, to a man, love our *Raj*; and it is a significant fact that, in all the Gaekwar's districts adjoining our territory, a Revenue Survey on our principle has been introduced, and is in progress, his Highness being thoroughly convinced of the prosperity and happiness of our ryots under that system, and fearing that a migration of his cultivators on a large scale into British districts is imminent."†

Sir Richard Temple, in the despatch already quoted, makes the following remark on the Native State last mentioned :—

"In 1864 I passed through the Baroda territory (the Gaekwar's Dominions); certainly that district, the valley of the Mhye, is in external prosperity hardly surpassed by any British district,—any that I have ever seen at least."‡

The Report on the administration of Baroda for the year 1867, by Colonel J. T. Barr, is dated in March, 1868. In

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 69.

† *Ibid.*, p. 66.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

the most unfavourable passage I can find in it, the Resident says he has occasionally received reports of "mismanagement on the part of the Durbar officials, causing loss of revenue, and sometimes injustice to portions of the population, not, however, amounting to open tyranny or oppression. These reports," he continues, "are promptly communicated to the Durbar at Baroda, and have, as a rule, been as promptly attended to, and the grievances brought to light redressed." Referring to some administrative reform introduced by his predecessor's influence, and which, for some time, it required a little watchfulness to maintain, he says, "there will be no resistance to its continuance, for Native States are never prone to alter arrangements they have become used to." The recently appointed Minister he describes as "a man of good character, highly esteemed by the Gaekwar," and under his rule "the State continues to be managed generally to suit our views."

He then refers to the circular from the Government of India "on the comparative merits of British and Native rule," intended by Sir John Lawrence to crush Lord Cranborne under what he termed "a concentration of statistics from different parts of India."*

As in duty bound, and as might fairly be expected, the Resident declares that "the superiority of the British system of rule over that of the Gaekwar, or any other purely Native rule I have known, is in my opinion clear, and not to be doubted; and yet," he adds, "I believe that the people of India do find something in the Courts of Native Princes which compensates for the better administration under our own immediate government." Probably, he suggests, "they find favour from the careers which they open out to Natives of the middle and higher classes."†

Quite lately the news from Bombay has told us of the Gaekwar having engaged in a movement for the extinction of some of the social abuses arising from caste and custom, in which direction the exertions of a liberal Prince

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, p. 4.

† *Homeward Mail*, October 26th, 1868.

are certain to be far more effective than any conceivable amount of British legislation or missionary preaching. The subjects that he has taken up are widow-marriage, the marriage of infants, and the permission of foreign travel without loss of caste. The manner in which his Highness is giving his aid to the movement, by associating himself and co-operating with the highly educated Natives of Bombay, and bringing them into public controversy with the learned Brahmins of his own Court, affords the best promise of a decisive result on the public opinion of Western India.*

Even in the Dominions of the Nizam, the largest existing Native State,—formerly a byword for misrule, and in which Lord Dalhousie, who declined to attempt its reform, could anticipate nothing but such “a crash” as would compel the British Government to “adopt strong measures,” and the Nizam to submit to “the fate which would then have overtaken him,”†—great progress has been made under the enlightened ministry of the Nawab Salar Jung. Sir Richard Temple, when Resident at Hyderabad in 1867, wrote as follows in the despatch that we have already quoted:—

“In the Deccan, of late years, the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam’s civil government are really excellent; this much is certain. That the result must be more or less beneficial to the country is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intentions of His Highness’s Government, throughout the Deccan, I cannot yet say; but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible.”‡

In the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1867-8, compiled at the India Office from the latest information, we are told that

“The vigorous efforts made towards reform have now placed the financial credit of the Nizam’s Government on a satisfactory footing; it enjoys the confidence of the monied class, and it can now raise money at very moderate rates of interest, instead of the usurious charges of former days.”§

With regard to the assessment of land-revenue it is said

* Appendix D.

† *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 40.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Administration*, p. 69.

§ *Moral and Material Progress*, 1867-8, p. 113.

that "pains have been taken more and more to render the annual settlements equitable and moderate;" and that "all classes, high and low, connected with land or with trade, continue to flourish."*

The judicial institutions are undergoing the process of being entirely though gradually remodelled, and the following reference is made to the new class of regularly appointed Magistrates and Judges, who will in time replace throughout the country the hereditary and land-holding jurisdictions which are still maintained in the Sovereign's domains and on some great nobles' estates.

"All these officers are well educated, though all have not done well; several had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. Many discharged their duties with more or less of efficiency; and some have by their firmness and uprightness brought credit to their department."†

The results of the restitution to the Nizam, under the Treaty of 1860, of two of the Districts assigned to British management by Lord Dalhousie's Treaty of 1853, have been most encouraging, both by the continued good management of the retransferred Districts, and in the stimulus and example thereby given to the general progress of the country. Complete restitution, conditional on the introduction of every essential reform into every Province, and into every department of the administration, might be made the means and occasion of regenerating the Nizam's Government.

One of the most satisfactory symptoms in the process of improvement now observable in so many Native States, is that the Sovereigns in general, even those who have themselves received no English education, are willing enough to engage the services of Natives brought up at our Colleges, and trained in our administrative system. Sir Madava Rao, K.C.S.I., the Brahmin Minister of Travancore, formerly tutor to the Maharajah and his brother, the First Prince, both of them accomplished English scholars,—is a graduate of the Madras University. The State of Jeypore, the most populous and the richest in

* *Moral and Material Progress*, p 114

† *Ibid*, 1869, p. 117.

Rajpootana, owes much of the advance it has made towards a system of law and order, to the labours of the late Pundit Sheodeen, a graduate of Calcutta, who was chosen by Maharajah Ram Singh, the present intelligent Ruler, first to be his Private Secretary, and afterwards to be his Prime Minister.

The Indian papers of September, 1869, announce that the Rajah of Bikaner, another Rajpoot State, has appointed Pundit Manphool, C.S.I., late Extra Assistant Commissioner under the Punjaub Government, to be his Dewan or Chief Minister.

We have already remarked that several of the judicial officers in the Nizam's Dominions had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. The same may be said of some recently appointed officials in the revenue and executive departments under the same Government.

It has also been brought to our notice in quotations from the Political Agent's Reports, that several pupils from the Indore College, "with an unusually good knowledge of English, and otherwise well educated," now "occupy important posts in the service of the Maharajah Holkar."* The present Governor of Bombay, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, speaking as Chancellor of the University on the 12th of January, 1869, mentioned as "a very great proof of the growing influence of the University, that among those who had lately matriculated two came from Indore, from the Madrisa of his Highness the Maharajah Holkar."† The local papers also explain that these students—two only having successfully passed the matriculation out of four sent from Indore,—are entirely supported at the Maharajah's expense during the prosecution of their studies for a degree.

And in describing the Convocation of the present year, a Bombay daily paper mentions as a fact very "significant of the wide range of the University's influence, that the first award of Mr. Ellis's prize of books goes to a youth from the Madrisa of his Highness the Maharajah Holkar at Indore."‡

* *Ante*, p. 19

† *Times of India*, 14th Jan., 1869.

‡ *Ibid.*, 13th Jan., 1870.

In 1867 his Highness the Rao of Kutch, himself a good English scholar, acting, it is said, under the advice and influence of the late Anundashram Swamy, the celebrated "Political Sunyassee,"* appointed a Mussulman gentleman, Kazee Shahab-ood-deen Ibrahim, to be his Dewan or Chief Minister. Kazee Shahab-ood-deen had pursued his studies before any University degrees were conferred in India, at the College and at the School of Engineering at Poona, and subsequently rose in the service of the Bombay Government to be Deputy Collector and Magistrate of Surat. Before mentioning the reforms introduced under his administration, it ought to be observed that Kutch has for many years borne the credit of being fairly and benevolently ruled. The *Bombay Administration Report* for 1860-1 thus refers to the reign of the present Rao's father, during whose minority, from 1819 to 1834, the State was under a Regency controlled by the British Political Agent.

"The first event which requires notice in connection with the affairs of the States and Principalities in Guzerat under the political supervision of this Government, is the death of his Highness the Rao Desuljee of Kutch, which occurred at the close of July 1860, after a singularly enlightened and prosperous reign of twenty-six years. In his Highness the British Government lost a faithful and esteemed Ally, and the people of Kutch a wise and beneficent Ruler."

The following remarks on Kutch occur in the Bombay Report for 1866-7.—

"The revenue administration has been successful, and education has progressed. The schools at Anjar and in other places were well attended during the year and have been favourably reported on by the Political Agent. A second Girls' School is to be opened almost immediately at Bhooj."

We read in the Report for 1867-68 :—

"A marked improvement has taken place in the administration of the Province of Kutch since the office of Dewan has been assumed by Mr. Shahab-ood-deen, lately Deputy Collector and Magistrate of Surat."

And after noticing several reforms effected during the year, such as the separation of judicial from revenue business, the establishment of a dispensary, the construction

* Appendix E

of roads and works of irrigation, the Report goes on to say,

“His Highness the Rao continues to evince a warm interest in education. He has personally examined the schools at Bhoj and Mandavee, and distributed prizes. The Girls’ School established by him at his capital is attended by fifty girls of different ages; the Mandavee school by about forty girls. His Highness has also employed a teacher solely for his young daughter, and has thus displayed to the Chiefs of the Province his entire emancipation from the popular prejudice against female education.”

Besides the Dewan, his Deputy, Moorleedhur Geerdhur, the head of revenue affairs, Bhojlall Pranvullubh Dass, and some recently appointed judicial officers, have received a good English education, and some of them underwent their official training in the service of our Government.

Yet with all this evidence of States reformed and reforming,—with and without British instruction as the first stage,—before their eyes and recorded in their archives, the Government of Sir John Lawrence at Calcutta, and the majority of the Secretary of State’s Council in London, wrote in 1865 and 1866, when striving to obtain the annexation of Mysore, as if the reform of a Native State were a hopeless task, and as if the restoration of a Native State to its own Ruler, after a period of British management, would be an unheard of and unprecedented measure. Although they ought to have known, and had the means of knowing, that several States—Travancore, for instance, under the Madras Government, and Kolapore, under that of Bombay,—had been brought from anarchy to good order by Native agency, superintended by only two or three British officers, the authorities at Calcutta assumed the necessity of quartering a full complement of English gentlemen in every department on Mysore, and protested that any less “radical alternative” would have been “futile and pernicious.”* They declared in a despatch of May 5th, 1865, that—

“When once his” (the Rajah’s) “mismanagement had brought things to that pass, that rebellion had to be put down by the

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

march of British troops, it admitted of no question, but that any attempt to rule the country through the Maharajah and his functionaries, by the issue of regulations and ordinances entrusted to them for execution, would have been regarded by an exasperated and revolted people as a piece of cruel mockery.”*

This fine phrase of “an exasperated and revolted people,” is one example of how, in their anxiety to retain so valuable a field of patronage,—for this, however disguised even from themselves, was at the bottom of all their objections,—the resources of rhetoric were stretched in Calcutta despatches and London Minutes very near the confines both of the *suppressio veri* and the *suggestio falsi*. In alluding to the Rajah’s misrule and to the petty revolt in part of his territories, the original grossly exaggerated accounts are taken as accurate narrations, and no hint is given of new light thrown on the facts by subsequent careful inquiry. The Mysore rebellion of 1830 was declared by the Special Commissioners, in their Report of 12th December, 1833, to have been “partly attributable to causes which were beyond the control of the Rajah’s administration,” especially “to the withdrawal of the advice of the British Resident,” who “was prohibited by his instructions not only from the public reception of complaints from the subjects of Mysore, but from the avowed support of the cause of those whose grievances might become known to him.” The insurrection was by no means general. It broke out in the Province of Nuggur, the conquest of which by Hyder Ali was a circumstance “unfavourable to the easy maintenance of the Rajah’s authority.” It was not a popular rising caused by intolerable tyranny, but was chiefly the work of an ambitious pretender to a large feudal estate, aided by insurgents who flocked to the rebel standard from the British Province of Canara, and by the intrigues of an influential Brahmin family at Mysore, whose oppressive and corrupt practices were then under investigation, and who hoped to evade inquiry amid the turmoil of an insurrection.

The Commissioners say expressly :—

“The fact of the assembling of the ryots and their complaining that the taxes were too burdensome to be borne, of itself really

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

proves little or nothing. At the very same time, the Ryots assembled in the same manner, and made similar complaints in the Province of Canara, where we understand the public demands have since been found, on full inquiry, to be decidedly moderate. We also understand, and it is a curious coincidence, that those proceedings of the ryots in Canara were instigated by intrigues on the part of the public servants, as has been already shown to have been the case in Mysore.”*

Both by the Commissioners of Inquiry and by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, after his own strict local investigation, the Rajah was almost entirely acquitted of personal misconduct. It was indeed admitted by his Lordship, that if he had known the true history of the case, as detailed in the Report of the Special Committee, he would not have suspended the Rajah's authority, but would have resorted to milder measures of reform.

In a despatch to the Court of Directors dated the 14th of April, 1834, recommending that the greater part of the Rajah's dominions should be restored to his direct rule, three districts being retained by the Honourable Company, under a new Treaty, to secure their subsidy, Lord William Bentinck wrote as follows :—

“It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Rajah, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described to be the reverse of tyrannical or cruel.” “The personal character of the Rajah has, I confess, materially weighed with me in recommending the measure above alluded to. I believe he will make a good ruler in future.”

The Court of Directors, in their reply dated the 25th of September, 1835, negative the project of partition. They advert to “the deferred and future possession of the whole Kingdom” by the Maharaja, when certain described safeguards against misgovernment shall be established ; when, they say, “the same reasons which would recommend the restoration to the Rajah of a portion of the country, will, in our opinion, recommend the restoration of the whole.”† And in making some remarks on the new forms of administration proposed for Mysore, they observe :—

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 19.

† *Ibid*, p. 23.

“We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the Native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by Native agency when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.”

But long before 1865 the vast increase of patronage in Mysore had driven far away all notions of “Native agency,” or of restoring the country to the Rajah. The idea of not merely being unable to provide for the candidates already on the Governor-General’s list, but of having to turn adrift, or remand to regimental duty, all the English gentlemen actually in the enjoyment of those lucrative offices, had become revolting at Calcutta. In a Minute dated the 16th of January, 1856, Lord Dalhousie advised the annexation of Mysore at the death of the reigning Rajah. Wishing devoutly, and working towards, the same consummation, the Government of Sir John Lawrence, in the despatch already quoted, loudly and emphatically pronounced as their opinion,

“That the reversion of Mysore to the power and administration of the Maharajah is synonymous with the withdrawal of the European officers, and the abandonment of a system of upwards of thirty years’ growth. It is tantamount to the collapse of order, and a rapid return to the state of confusion and of insecurity of life, honour, and property, from which, in 1831, the people of Mysore were rescued.”*

Why should “the system” be “abandoned,” when “the European officers” are “withdrawn?” They cannot, or will not, think of any intermediate plan, by which the Prince’s power might for the future be limited by law, and by which an efficient Native hierarchy might be gradually trained to replace their English instructors. No—a full complement of English gentlemen of the Civil, Military, and Uncovenanted Services having been quartered in every department—new departments having been from time to time devised for them,—that full complement must be permanently maintained in Mysore.

The same views were urged with even greater vehemence at the India Office in London. One of the Councillors, Mr. R. D. Mangles, formerly of the Bengal Civil

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

Service, and who for many years represented the Borough of Guildford and the East India Company in the House of Commons, declared that if the Maharajah of Mysore were permitted to choose a successor from his family, "only two courses would be open to us,"—

"Either the adopted son must be permitted to become the actual ruler of his country, to appoint his own officers, and to administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles, or affairs must be carried on, as at present, by a British Commissioner, assisted by a body of British officers."*

Notwithstanding the undeviating consistency with which Mr. Mangles for the last quarter of a century, in the Court of Directors, in Parliament, and in the Council of India, has advocated a policy of annexation, it is difficult to understand the strange blindness here shown to the happiest and most hopeful results of our political operations in India. Why must a Rajah placed at the head of a reformed Government, "administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles"? Why should he not administer justice and the revenue according to *our* views and principles, as several Native Princes have, to a great extent, learned to do?

This blindness to recorded facts is even more manifest in a subsequent passage of the same paper, in which Mr. Mangles avows his firm opinion that "Native Government" must be "entirely dependent upon the character of the Prince, or, if he be a nonentity, of his Minister," and that they "have, as a general rule, been going from bad to worse ever since the reign of Akbar."†

At a later period in the discussion, the same eminent authority protested once more against the people of Mysore being "handed over by Her Majesty's present Government to the capricious domination of such another Prince, with the inevitable concomitants of hungry courtiers, and a rabble of hangers-on, after they and their fathers had tasted for nearly half a century the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue, administered by such men as Cubbon, Bowring,

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 87.

and Charles Saunders.”* The introduction of these English names at the end of the sentence is an effective stroke of rhetoric. But why should “capricious domination” be assumed, or the possibility of “capricious domination”? Is the British Government really incompetent to exercise Imperial supremacy?

During the same controversy another much respected Councillor, Mr. H. T. Prinsep, also an old Bengal Civilian, who had been Secretary to Government under Lord William Bentinck when the administrative sequestration of Mysore took place, maintained in a Minute dated the 15th of April, 1866, that “it would be impossible ever to make over a large territory like Mysore, that has once been governed upon system by British officers, who have made revenue settlements and decreed or otherwise established rights of property, to a Native Prince *to be managed according to his caprices, assigning districts to favourites with unchecked powers, or leasing them to the highest bidders, as is the universal practice when the dominions are large.*” And then he assumes, as an incontrovertible and acknowledged position, that the only plan for “securing the rights and interests created by our institutions,” is to maintain “a British administration.”† Now the practice of “assigning districts” to “favourites,” or to “the highest bidder,” is not, and never was, “universal” by any means among the Native States of India, whether “the dominions are large” or small. Mr. Prinsep has here fallen into one of those exaggerations which are especially detrimental when put forward in grave consultation by a person of great official and local experience. And why must the “caprices” of a Prince, and the “powers” of his “favourites” be “unchecked”? The bad custom of granting territorial assignments to favourites and farmers of the revenue, had grown in Oude before the annexation to the greatest height and enormity it had probably ever attained in India: but if the controlling force of the British Government had been firmly and steadily applied, this abuse might have been effectually checked and abolished. This abuse does not prevail in the States of

* *Mysore Papers*, May 1867, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

either Scindia or Holkar, the two largest and most important in Central India, and is quite incompatible with their administrative system, for which, no doubt, their subjects are greatly indebted to the management of British officers during the minority of the two reigning Princes. In Travancore, in Kolapore,—in any State once fairly brought under supervision, and where regular forms and public channels have been laid down through which all acts of the Sovereign must pass,—corrupt and capricious grants of land are practically impossible. Even in the Nizam's Dominions, the largest existing Native State, although the prevalence of this abuse in former generations has left its trace in some overgrown hereditary jurisdictions, the executive agency of the Chief Minister, supported by the influence of our Resident, has so over-mastered the nominal despotism, that, during the last three reigns, the Prince has quite lost the Oriental prerogative of alienating the public revenue. These limitations of arbitrary power, though secured by no public ordinance, soon grow into established rules, and an Indian Sovereign would find it quite as difficult and dangerous to break through them as have the Princes of Europe after consenting or submitting to constitutional restrictions.

The Nawab Salar Jung, having become head of the Regency of Hyderabad upon the sudden demise of the late Nizam, and retaining all the functions of Prime Minister, has been able already to make a great stride towards the liberalisation of the Government by associating several of the principal nobles with himself in a sort of Council of State, and allotting to each of its members a department of the public administration,—a measure which was quite impracticable so long as the Minister was liable to be thwarted at every turn by petty Palace intrigues set on foot by those who could obtain no voice in the State except by supplanting their rival and stepping into his place. Having overcome and outlasted the despotism of the Sovereign, this enlightened statesman is now engaged in breaking down in his own person the isolated autocracy of the Minister. Properly advised and supported by our Government on a plan more consistent and more consider-

rate than has hitherto been observed, the Nawab Salar Jung ought to be able during the minority of the Nizam to raise the reformed institutions of Hyderabad above all fear of retrogression, to bring a limited monarchy into working condition on principles that shall be acceptable and suitable to all ranks of the people.

It is to be hoped that our Government may do as much during the concurrent minority of the Rajah of Mysore. But there the stumbling-block of place and patronage stops the way at present.

The aggregate salaries of the English gentlemen employed in Mysore, about ninety in number, from the Commissioner with his £6000 down to the Assistant with £600, averaging £1000 a year, amount to £90,000 per annum, one tenth of the annual net revenues of the Province. The official mind cannot contemplate without horror the gradual destruction of such a splendid list of appointments, the vested rights of meritorious gentlemen having so many strong claims on the consideration of Government. Even the stagnation and stoppage of promotion among such a body, the first painful result in the process of reconstructing the fabric of a Native State, cannot be faced by the dispensers of patronage without distress and consternation. What is the degradation of a race, alien in colour and creed, compared with the disheartening of a Service recruited from our own countrymen?

Consequently the instructions understood to have been issued by the Secretary of State in 1867 for the gradual substitution of Native for English officials, as opportunities presented themselves, in all district and judicial appointments, has remained a complete dead letter. In three years not a single Native has been placed in any one of the superior offices in Mysore hitherto held by English gentlemen. No such promotion has, indeed, occurred for nearly six years. Mr. Krishna Ayengar is still the only Native Deputy Superintendent; and he was appointed to the charge of a district on the 31st of August 1864. And so it will be to the very last possible moment,—the difficulties of transition will be enhanced, the immediate suc-

cess of the change will be endangered, the good faith of our Government will be compromised,—unless the professional interests and national prejudices of Calcutta are counteracted and swept away by the statesmanlike determination of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.

It is useless to descant, as Mr. Mangles and others do, on “the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue,”* because these can be provided for as effectually in a reformed Native State as in a model British Province, and can be “administered” in a style much more congenial to popular feelings and much more instructive to the popular mind, by Native Princes and functionaries, than by “Cubbon, Bowring, or Charles Saunders.” The best institutions that can be devised are not permanently safe unless they are under the personal and responsible custody of men who are bound to the soil by the ties of blood and property. The happiness and progress of nations do not depend on forms.

One fruitful cause of error in the study of Indian politics, one ground for hastily taking for granted, without alloy or deduction, “the unspeakable blessings” of British administration, consists in the indiscriminate eulogy that has been too often lavished on the Indian Civil Service. Indiscriminate eulogy applied to a class, a sect, or a party, must always lead to some very false conclusions. It was once the fashion in Parliamentary speeches and periodical essays to extol that Service as “the most accomplished in the world,” at a time when a safe passage, “with great credit,” through the formal probation of Haileybury, was never refused to a Director’s nominee, and as a “nursery of heroes and rulers,” when, in proportion to its numerical strength, it had certainly produced very few men of marked originality or conspicuous power. But in those days the rapid growth of British India in territory and revenue cast a glamour over all eyes. The structure was so vast, and had been so hidden, that what was a mere appropriation seemed like a creation of our own. Distance lent enchantment to the view,—young Civilians, and military officers in civil employ, engaged for the most part in the

* *Ante*, p. 33.

formal superintendence of an immemorial routine, were transfigured into patriarchs and statesmen. And though the competitive system of first appointments has raised the standard of erudition, it is no test of administrative capacity or of the ruling faculty, and has certainly added nothing to any social authority that may be possessed by the Indian Civil Service.

When we consider the early age at which English gentlemen engaged in the public administration of India are placed in positions of great emolument, and of unattainable exaltation and command, over a large number of Native officials of tried skill and long experience, whose guidance is indispensable for the successful despatch of business, it is not surprising that they learn to magnify their office, that they habitually suppose themselves to be governing the country when they just understand the plan of administering a district, when they can make a neat English report on results furnished by their subordinates. As an illustration of the prevailing delusion on this point, we may quote the able editor of the *Bombay Gazette*, a journal representing very fairly the views of the higher class of British officials and merchants in the Western Presidency, who, recently defending the Great Council of the Empire from the charge of negligence, declares that

“What is called neglect of India is one of the wisest characteristics of Parliament. That India is not neglected, the host of able Englishmen sent here to govern her testifies before the whole world.”

The writer confounds *administration* with *government*. The Englishmen, able or otherwise, annually sent out from home in the civil and military Services, do not govern India, any more than our Commissioners of Customs and Excise, officers of Police, and County Court Judges, govern Great Britain. In both countries the functionaries in permanent employ administer laws which they had no share in making, have little or no influence over public opinion, and no political influence by virtue of their office. Whether they have or have not any social influence, depends not upon their office so much as

upon their personal qualities. The social influence of English functionaries in India is scarcely appreciable. They have, as a rule, no social influence whatever among any class of the people, simply because they neither desire nor deserve to have any. They have no social influence with the Natives, because they have no social intercourse with them. Even with the most accessible of our Collectors and Commissioners in India, the practical notice at their doors is, "No admittance except on business." The subject races in their millions, high and low, rich and poor, and the scattered representatives of the dominant nation, live entirely apart, and have nothing in common. The public avocations of the Anglo-Indian "Services" give them no direct share, and their private course of life precludes them from taking any indirect share, in what is properly called the *government* of the country.

A very few British functionaries, those who rise to the Secretariat and to seats in Council, do, indeed, obtain access to a certain direct share in the Government; and these extraordinary prizes to which all may aspire, have, perhaps, contributed more than anything else to the false lustre surrounding the Indian Civil Service, and to the erroneous notions habitually formed by the members of that profession as to the sphere and compass of their daily duties.

There are, again, British Commissioners and Collectors, —very few, however, in number,—singularly free from the prevalent failings of our nation and of their profession, largely endowed with that genial tolerance and adaptability, which are supremely requisite for governing an alien race on any principles but those of coercion and contempt. Some of these have undoubtedly, from time to time, gained an influence, considerable though local and temporary, over the public mind, and have made meritorious efforts of limited success, to keep up something like social intercourse with the higher class of Natives around them.

A still larger number of British officials among the Residents at Native Courts, and the Political Agents set over the groups of petty Chieftainships, really take a cer-

tain indirect share in the Imperial Government, just because they have some social influence and control over the leaders and idols of the people. It is only in these hereditary jurisdictions, where the executive power remains in Native hands, that Native volition and intelligence are sufficiently free to make it worth while to study them, to consult them, and even to humour them. It is only in these last refuges of nationality, where there is a career for talent, and where distinctions of rank and station have a real value, and receive due recognition, that anything like personal intercourse on fair terms can exist between our representatives and those of India. As might be reasonably expected, in the dependent States, where Native influence manifestly counts for something, where it is always effective, and frequently decisive, it is more courted than in our own Provinces, where it seems to count for nothing.

Our most distinguished countrymen now or recently engaged in the administration of British Provinces, have not failed to remark and to deplore this utter disassociation of the dominant and the pupil race. Sir Robert Montgomery, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in a Memorandum published in *The Times* in March 1868, called forth by the appearance of the Blue Book on the comparative merits and popularity of British and Native rule, writes as follows :—

“Our officers are young, and few and scattered, and have much to learn. To administer the mass of law imposed on them they are chained to their courts and their offices from morning till night. They have no leisure for personal intercourse, to mix with the people, to gain their trust, to disabuse them of unjust prejudices, to make known our motives of real benevolence, and to ascertain their views. An acute observer of one of our most recently annexed Provinces informs me that the gulf is increasing, the people are disheartened.”

An acute observer in the capital of one of our oldest Provinces, the official metropolis of the Indian Empire, tells the same story. The Editor of the *Friend of India*, who may certainly be considered as an unwilling witness rather than as one prejudiced against British administration, writes as follows :—

"It is as true of Bengal to-day as it has been any day for the last eighty years, that there is a Government and there are forty millions of people, but somehow the one does not come into close contact with the other. Some of the people know our policemen and the scum of our courts, and the better they know them the more they hate them and us. But the villagers do not know the district officer, and the district officer and his superiors cannot know them."

Similar testimony is given by a very able official, the late Mr. A. A. Roberts, then Judicial Commissioner in the Punjaub, who declares that

"The gulf between us and our Native subjects is becoming wider year by year. It is wider in Bengal than in the North-Western Provinces, and it is wider in the latter than in the Punjaub. It is becoming wider every year in the Punjaub. Our executive officers, partly from increase of work, and partly either from want of inclination, or from not understanding the necessity and advantage of friendly intercourse with the people, see less and know less of them than formerly, and they know less of us, and misunderstand us and our motives and acts."*

The longer and more thoroughly our system has been established, the less we are liked. He concludes thus, after a not very hopeful allusion to "the necessity of greater intercourse with, and knowledge of, and sympathy towards our Native subjects":—

"The following words of Sir John Malcolm express so exactly my views of our duty towards the people of this country that I cannot do better than quote them — 'The people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters; and this can only be done by the combined efforts of every individual employed in a station of trust and responsibility, to render popular a Government which, though not national, has its foundations laid deep in the principles of toleration, justice, and wisdom.'"+

We may render our Imperial Government popular: we can never make our direct administration popular. The divergence of feeling and interest between our people and the Natives is not an evil that tends to decrease or to cure itself. On the contrary, it has increased, is increasing, and must continue to increase, in proportion as the growing facilities of correspondence and communication with

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 112. † *Ibid.*

Europe diminish the attractions of Indian service and enhance the charms of home.

"Our own" Calcutta Correspondent, in a letter which appeared in the *Times* on the 23rd of March, 1868, says :— "No non-missionary remains in India an hour longer than he can help."

There is a remarkable unanimity in the tidings from all parts as to the growing aversion to long service or residence in India. From a paper published at the Neilgherry Hills in the Madras Presidency the following sentence is extracted .—

"Even here in Ootacamund, where so many advantages as to health, soil, and climate offer themselves, we doubt if a score of Europeans could be found who are not looking forward to return, sooner or later, to the old country. A man comes out to India, either as a Government servant, a railway *employé*, a planter, or what not; but not one of them has the faintest idea of making a home here :—to make a 'pot of money' and go back again is the aim of every one of them."*

The *Englishman*, the leading daily paper of Calcutta, gives the same account :—

"Individually, we are more than ever birds of passage. If Europeans did not build houses forty years ago, when they looked upon India somewhat as a home, there is very little chance of their doing so now that their main object is to get away from India as fast as possible."†

Consequently, as might be expected, the members of the most highly paid Services, civil and military, in the world, send up their continuous cry for a higher scale of remuneration, in the form of salary or pension or bonus on retirement. The Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times* tells us that

"India has ceased to offer a career to poor men. Saving by men on salaries of from £1500 downwards is almost impossible. Pitiable often is the state of an English gentleman on £500 a year in Indian exile.‡

* *South of India Observer*, extracted from the *Asiatic*, of August 11th, 1869.

† *Englishman*, from the *Homeward Mail*, August 30th, 1869.

‡ "Our own Correspondent", Calcutta, March 9th, *The Times*, April 8th, 1867.

And nearly three years later the Editor of the *Friend of India*, well informed in such matters, writes as follows :—

“The Anglo-Indian with less than twelve hundred a year finds it impossible to meet the cost of living here, and pay for his children at home. That sort of pecuniary care so well known in England, but almost unknown in India before the mutiny, is silently working in Anglo-Indian society changes which are to be regretted.”*

It can hardly be expected that this “pecuniary care”, these “changes in Anglo-Indian society”, the growing aversion to long residence in India, the yearning to get home as fast as possible, will be in the least mitigated or diminished when educated Natives are admitted, in rapidly increasing numbers, to the superior branches of the public service, hitherto reserved for covenanted Civilians. That inevitable measure will certainly not accelerate the promotion, improve the prospects, or alleviate the discontent of any English official

But, it may be said, although this measure, just, liberal, and beneficent as all must acknowledge it to be, may unfavourably affect a class of our countrymen, and even bring some administrative difficulties in its train, it will so conciliate and gratify the people of India as to render the great task of Government more easy. That flattering expectation is open to very considerable doubt. The admission of Natives to the higher official posts, except as part of a large plan of Imperial reconstruction, will not, in my opinion, strengthen, but will rather weaken, the hands of Government, and complicate the problem before it.

Native officials of high rank could not form an effective bond of connection between the British Government and the people of India. They would not be sympathetic with us so much as antipathetic to the masses. In popular estimation, and partly in their own, they have loosened their root in the soil, and have become parasites planted in our hot-houses. Natives educated in our colleges and

* *Friend of India*, extracted from *Homeward Mail*, December 6th, 1869.

seeking for our service are not a turbulent or fanatical class, and they cannot aid us in keeping such classes in order. They are not very often of the right breed to govern, and as a matter of fact they are, in manners, customs, and morals, governed by the same laws and the same lawgivers as their more ignorant countrymen. They can never wrest social influence, in our favour or in their own, from the hands of the Princes, the Chieftains, the old families possessing titles, property and traditional fame, or from the Brahmins and other classes learned in popular lore and revered on religious grounds, who are themselves by no means debarred for ever from the advantages of European learning and science. As a matter of fact old prejudices, both in British Provinces and in Native States, are yielding to the surrounding pressure, and Western education is spreading, though slowly, among the real governing classes.

Moreover, it may well be doubted whether our Government can ever possess, as it is possessed by a good Native Ruler, the faculty of selecting and distributing its agents according to their special capabilities where they can command the respect and obedience of those who are under their authority. We impose our own wide range on men whose force and value is essentially local. Relying too much on forms and regulations, disregarding not merely personal qualities but the strength and weakness, the attractions and repulsions of tribe and race, our latest liberality would send Bengalee and Parsee graduates, in a very undue proportion, to rule over Sikhs, Mahrattas, and Rajpoots. There may be Parsees and there may be Bengalees, and there may be Chettys and Moodellys from Madras, who are well qualified for such duties, but mere erudition is a very poor test of the requisite qualifications.

There is another view to be taken of this question. Educated Natives are certainly not at present a turbulent or aggressive class, but it does not follow that their open competition with English officials on something like equal terms, will make them more submissive, or will raise the reputation and heighten the dignity of those with whom

they compete. Already the transmutation of the old Head Sheristadars, or Office Managers, into the comparatively new grades of Deputy Collectors and Magistrates, Extra Assistants in the Non-Regulation Provinces and Assistant Superintendents in Mysore,—more honourable, perhaps, but not more highly paid than their old appointments,—is understood to have vitiated the source, impaired the quality, and aggravated the corrupt results of the information and guidance on which all young English officials for a time, and the failures and “hard bargains” during their entire career, must depend for the despatch of current business. Failures and “hard bargains,” though less common under the competitive system of first appointments than during the continuance of Directors’ patronage, can not be totally eliminated from a hierarchy, in which neither dismissal nor stoppage of promotion is practically known. Formerly the untrained young Civilian, or the incompetent old one, was pulled through his daily work by a ministerial expert of long service and high salary. Now he is pulled through by a younger man of lower standing and much smaller pay. The better class of Native subordinates who used to work unseen for the relief and credit of their “covenanted” superiors, are now beginning to officiate in open day at the same description of work, endowed with the same powers and in visible emulation.

The more Natives are employed in the higher posts, the more visible will this emulation become, the more conspicuous will be their administrative superiority over the average of their English compeers,—already sufficiently conspicuous in judicial business,—the less will they be content with anything but a perfect equality of standing and preferment. Then, whether their claims are recognised or resisted, interminable jealousies and antagonisms will ensue, and the difficulty, insurmountable in my opinion, will present itself, that English gentlemen will not serve amicably and harmoniously, except in rare instances, in subordination to Native seniors. The conflict will become more bitter on both sides.

As education is extended, as the means of communica-

tion and locomotion are improved, both in India and between the East and Europe,—in which the Suez Canal may prove an unexpectedly important element,—there must come a closer approximation to our ways of thought, to our principles and practice of political movement. The reflective and influential among our Indian fellow-subjects will become at once more national and more cosmopolitan. They will better our instructions. The Press is free in India. We shall find ourselves in imminent danger of finding our own weapons turned against us. As the people become more enlightened we must expect our Government, if conducted on the present contemptuous and exclusive plan, to be depicted in the most odious colours, and our agents to be attacked at every opportunity with ridicule and invective. We must be prepared, in short, for an era of satire and sedition, which we may be led, against our will and against our convictions, to resist by coercive measures, until we give up our moral and intellectual superiority, and oppose our military force to the physical force of awakened India.

We shall never be able to deal satisfactorily with a Hindoo Savonarola, a Hindoo Junius, a Paul Louis Courier, or even a Henri Rochefort. A Native Prince would have all the aversion we could wish against both the old-fashioned fanatic and the new-fangled agitator, and could, with the countenance and support of the Imperial Power, suppress or moderate either of them more firmly, more gently, and with more discrimination, than the Imperial Power could possibly do by itself.

In the following passage of his speech on the Governor-General of India Bill in the House of Lords on the 11th of March, 1869, the Marquis of Salisbury manifested, if I am not mistaken, some statesmanlike insight into the embarrassments we are preparing for ourselves, and into the only possible remedy for them :—

“The other portion of the noble Duke’s measure was that which dealt with the difficult problem of taking Natives into Government employment. He thought the noble Duke’s plan infinitely superior to the system of competitive examinations. He thought it far better that the appointment of Natives should rest

the races to be governed which must consign them to perpetual stagnation, or incite them to privy conspiracy.

The numerous annexations and confiscations between 1848 and 1856 attracted the attention and sympathy of all India towards the Native Princes and Chieftains, whose representative value was recalled to mind when their last hour seemed approaching, and who subsequently acquired strength, credit and authority on all sides by the events and results of the Rebellion of 1857. Since that crisis we may have elaborated some of our administrative machinery,—we have certainly effected a vast amount of over-legislation,—but we have not resumed our grasp upon the popular mind or upon the popular imagination. What we have lost the Princes have gained. We have now a smaller actual share in the true government of India, in the tranquillisation and progressive direction of the Indian people, than we had twenty years ago. We may regain the leadership, which will otherwise slip from us altogether, but only by deciding to rule India as a great Vassal Empire and not as a Vassal Kingdom,—by abstaining as far as possible from direct administration, and gradually transferring a great part of our immediate possessions to Native States, thoroughly reformed and thoroughly subordinated to the Paramount Imperial Power.

Sir Robert Montgomery in the remarkable Memorandum published in the *Times* in March 1868, which we have already quoted,* says:—

“The common error lies in our insular proneness to contract and generalise—to embody in one class all the many separate nationalities and distinct races which have been successively added to the rule of England. In an Empire made up of such differing languages and distinct customs, it must be popular, as it is politic, to encourage to a great extent a local administration and a local adaptation of laws.”

That “local administration” and “local adaptation of laws”, which Sir Robert Montgomery sees is so urgently required, can never be so effectually promoted as by the maintenance, restoration, and enlargement of Native Principalities.

* *Ante* p 40.

But we have still more recent, and stronger because unintentional testimony to the excessive centralisation and straining after uniformity of which we complain. The Honourable H. S. Maine, Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council, in a Minute dated the 8th of October, 1868, replying to the charge of over-legislation that had been brought against the Government of India, observes that "the great bulk of the legislation of the Supreme Council is attributable to its being the local Legislature of many Indian Provinces. These Provinces", he remarks, "exhibit very wide diversities, and it is growing more and more difficult to bring the population of two or more Provinces under any one law which goes closely home to their daily life and habits."

Habemus confitentem reum. India is not a country but a continent. The varying interests and requirements of its two hundred millions of inhabitants, speaking upwards of twenty distinct languages, cannot be adequately watched and tended by a centralised Government of salaried officials such as now attempts to rule all India by correspondence from Calcutta. Such a Government cannot continue for an indefinite period to be satisfactory and improving to the people in its action.

Reforms of political doctrine and practice in Native States are solid and secure; the vast administrative establishments in our own Provinces,—so far as they are dependent for their success on foreign imported agency, and foreign imported material,—are superficial and precarious. Showy specimens may be produced—under glass, as it were,—exotic fruits may be grafted on the native stock; even artificial flowers may be hung on the branches with brilliant effect; but they will not stand the climate: a bad season spoils their appearance; the first storm sends them flying. Nations cannot live in glass houses, and a horticultural show is not a harvest.

Much of our vast administrative structure in India is little more than a show,—a show very burdensome to the country. Some departments have outgrown all reasonable proportions, have quite ceased to impose upon the people, and far from being regarded by them as "un-

speokable blessings," are felt as extremely oppressive by the poor, and regarded as monstrously inefficient and expensive by those who are more competent to criticise and to condemn. I shall not attempt here to present this aspect of the question in detail, or to discuss very fully the financial delinquency which has only just been such as might have been expected from an irresponsible professional Government, instructed by no popular voice, controlled by no public opinion.

After nine years of profound peace, the revenue having increased twenty-five per cent. (from thirty-nine to more than forty-eight millions*), "the Indian Exchequer,"—to use the recent words of Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie, late Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, certainly well informed and as certainly well disposed towards the Government of India,—“shows a chronic deficit of two millions, and wholesale reduction of public expenditure combined with the prospect of increased taxation is spreading discontent and distress throughout the Empire.”†

All the phenomena in that same matter of “increased taxation,” which has caused so much official disagreement and recrimination, so many commercial remonstrances, so many popular complaints and so much dumb misery during the last ten years, demonstrate most clearly that want of harmony between “the opinions and feelings of the Natives,” and “the acts of our officials,” of which Sir Charles Wingfield is conscious,‡ which might in some degree be palliated and relieved by those “consultative Native Councils” that he suggests, but which can never be entirely cured by any thing but local self-government. And no local self-government but government by Native States will ever work smoothly. The same tax will never suit equally well, either in its incidence or in the mode of collection prescribed, all the Provinces of our centralised Empire, differing, as they do, in their prevailing races and languages, in their centres and staples of industry, in their standard of comfort and rate of living.

* Sir Richard Temple's Budget Speech in the Viceregal Council at Calcutta, on the 6th of March, 1869.

† *Fortnightly Review*, March 1870, p. 308.

‡ *Ante*, p. 2.

Having bungled for the last eight or nine years with our Income Tax and our License Tax, we are now, it is said, going to try our hand at a Succession Duty, which if levied in the same way by an Act of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, will assuredly prove a similar failure, inquisitorial and oppressive in its operation, and producing very little for a great amount of heart-burning.

We shall never have either the knowledge or the influence to make a new tax adapt itself to the local circumstances and social customs of so many various regions. Those who could help us have no inducement to do so, and have no confidence in our good intentions. In the endeavour to assess all the Provinces of a vast continent on a uniform scale and by a uniform process, whether applied to property, income, profession, or inheritance, the same results will follow. The new taxes will disgust and demoralise, but they will not draw. In some localities they will not go deep enough; in others they will not rise to a sufficient height; in all they will be evaded.

We have observed that the Indian revenues have increased nearly twenty-five per cent. in the last nine years, or by about ten millions sterling. But only a small part of this increase can be attributed to any real financial elasticity, or be considered as a proportionate measure of the general progress and prosperity of India. Partly it must be accounted for by the universal rise in prices, which has affected all new assessments as well as all expenditure. But at least nine millions out of the ten are due to heavier taxation and to a precarious augmentation of nearly four millions in a precarious resource—the Opium monopoly. Of the new and enhanced taxation of six millions and a quarter, one million and a quarter arise from increased consumption of ardent spirits, encouraged by our peculiar Excise laws,—two millions and a quarter from the additional tax on salt, raising an article essential to the health of a very poor and vegetarian population to twenty times the price it bears in England, the richest country in the world,—one million and a half from a higher Stamp duty, or in other words a higher tax on justice. The license tax only produced £650,000. The Land revenue

did not increase materially in the decade between 1859 and 1869, and the Customs, the duties having been largely reduced, did not increase at all.

The most ingenious analysis would fail to trace any appreciable share in the augmentation of the revenues of India, under any heading, to the influence of railways,*—nothing that could form the most trifling set-off against the annual charge of at least £2,400,000,† which the guaranteed railways have entailed upon the State. With this annual charge staring them in the face,—with the facts before them, admitted in recently published despatches, that the average net income of the existing lines only amounted to three per cent. on the bare cost of their formation,‡ “although the lines already completed, or in course of construction, occupy the most fruitful field for railway enterprise,”—the Government of India, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, has pledged itself to undertake the construction of ten thousand miles of new railways at an estimated expense of £100,000,000, “raising the money upon its own credit, and expending it by the agency of their own officers.”§ That is to say, nearly a hundred millions having been laid out in constructing five thousand miles of railway which, far from paying, impose an annual burden on the country of two millions and a half sterling, and all the lines of first importance being occupied, we are now to construct ten thousand miles more

* Appendix F.

† Deficiency of guaranteed interest paid by Government. .£1,500,000

Interest at 5 per cent. on (at least) £18,000,000 borrowed to pay for land and for guaranteed interest... 900,000

£2,400,000

‡ From the Viceroy in Council to the Secretary of State, dated the 11th of March, 1869. Here are the figures from the Report of Mr. Juland Danvers for the year ending 30th June, 1868 (issued in August 1869)—Capital expended, exclusive of the cost of land (paid by Government), £78,986,655; Net receipts for the year, £2,100,122, being £237,178 less than the previous year. This is less than 3 per cent. If the cost of land and accumulated guaranteed interest were added, at least £18,000,000, the net returns would be little more than 2 per cent.

§ See Speech by the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords, on the 23rd of July, 1869.

at a cost of a hundred millions more, on lines of comparatively small traffic, and perhaps they may pay. This is the panacea for a chronic deficit!

It would be difficult to point out any symptoms of statesmanlike originality and insight, of far extended research and inquiry, of administrative skill, or even of conscientious frugality, in the financial history of India during the last ten years. But for the candour and energy displayed by the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, on the magnitude of the crisis becoming known to him, there would be little ground for hope in the immediate future. Sir Richard Temple, in his speech before the Viceregal Council on the 6th of March 1869, introducing the Budget for 1869-70, which even then showed an acknowledged deficit of one million sterling, very soon to be more than doubled by more careful calculation, eulogised the financial policy of Government as "at once safe, just, and sound;" and proudly mentioned "the national balance-sheet exhibiting eighty millions on each side of the account,—truly a high figure demonstrative of the calibre of our power in the East," as "a spirit-stirring fact." As if there were anything "demonstrative of power," anything that ought to be "spirit-stirring," in the mere magnitude of money transactions, irrespective of their solvency and solidity.

To an intelligent Native who has watched and analysed the extravagant expenditure and the delusive economies of the last ten years, the vituperations of the late Viceroy and of a party in the Secretary of State's Council, when advising the annexation of Mysore, against "excessive extravagance," "reckless profusion and dissipation of means,"* by a Native Prince, must seem a hollow mockery. As a general rule, the administration of a Native State is carried on with remarkable frugality, and hard cash accumulates in the treasury, or in the private hoards of the Prince, to provide for future exigencies. With augmented taxes and a rapidly increasing revenue, our Government gets deeper into debt, the expenditure of the last three financial years having exceeded the income by nine millions sterling.† The excellence and purity of our motives and

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 60.

† Appendix G.

intentions cannot affect the financial results, can afford no consolation or compensation for the large amount of useless expenditure.

Without being obliged to argue, with Mandeville, that private vices are public benefits, the Natives of India cannot fail to see that what we call the "reckless profusion" of a Native Prince,—in the few cases admitting of such an imputation,—is far more advantageous to the country than the temperance and thrift of the English officials who would supplant him. Whatever the Native Prince may spend is spent in India, chiefly in his own Principality. His patriarchal bounty supports thousands who would find no place at our board. The manufacture of many fabrics and articles of luxury, the encouragement of native art and learning, depend almost entirely upon the patronage of the Sovereign and his Court. The splendour of his genial hospitality, public ceremonies and processions, is a constant source of national pride, entertainment and social recreation to all ranks and classes. All this must cease if the Principality becomes a British Province; everything then must settle down to a dull and uniform level. The stately dinner-parties and gay balls, in which the small English community take delight, may be highly civilised and intellectual diversions, worthy of general respect and admiration; but these festivities can hardly be expected to rouse much popular interest, for Natives, even of the highest rank, are very seldom invited to them. The high moral character and domestic virtues of our officers, who do not mix with the Natives at all and never meet them except officially, afford no equivalent in popular estimation for the money they drain out of the Province to supply the wants of their families, and to provide for their future years of retirement at home.

When a well informed Native hears the Rajah of Mysore, or any other Prince, denounced for surrounding himself with "parasites," "hangers on," "favourites," and "courtiers,"* who are declared to "exist on the public revenues," and to "fatten on the corruption of the Court,"† he can

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 89, Ditto, 1867, p. 9.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 54.

hardly avoid inquiring whether the British Government has no "hangers on" of its own? What is he to think of "the hundreds of highly paid military officers leading a life of aimless idleness, under the verbal fiction that they are 'doing duty,'"—of "the hill stations presenting an array of unemployed Colonels and Majors," receiving salaries of £1000 and £800 per annum respectively, to the amount of "something like a million sterling a year." These things we find mentioned in a recent number of the *Friend of India*, by no means a seditious journal; and most people would be inclined to admit the truth of its very mild comment, that "the payment of handsome salaries for doing nothing is at best unproductive expenditure."* No doubt need be thrown on the good intentions of the Government, on the merits of the unemployed officers, far superior in every point of view to the "parasites" of a Rajah, or on the assertion that they are justly entitled to all that they receive. But it may well be disputed whether the system under which these gentlemen have become entitled in a very poor country to such very large pay for little or no work, can be fairly extolled for its far-sighted economy, or is likely to be regarded by a Native politician as an utterly "unspeakable blessing." The "parasites" of a Rajah, it must also be observed, are not regarded by Natives, who know them better than we do, with that impatient horror and indiscriminate indignation so natural and so admirable in members of the dominant race.

When we complain that as in the Army so also in almost every civil department, a superfluous number of highly paid and (if I may coin the word) highly pensionable English gentlemen, are entertained, no question or doubt is raised of the great benefits conferred by the establishment of regular and orderly government, which, in many instances, could only have been effectually initiated by British intervention. But this could have been equally well done without destroying the fabric of local institutions, without excluding and proscribing Native talent, and treating an entire population with contempt. The work for which, perhaps, forty English officers were employed

* *Friend of India*, extracted from the *Asiatic* of January 19th, 1870.

could have been performed as well, with the assistance of Natives alone, by the two or three able and well qualified men who, in fact, devised and directed the whole process. Instead of this wise and just moderation, English gentlemen with no special qualifications have been everywhere, in our own Provinces and in Mysore, forced into office, so that at the present day every district and every department is over-manned and over-paid to a degree that will not be believed until it is thoroughly and impartially investigated.

A very striking disclosure and clear admission of this abuse, at least in one department, has been very recently given in the reductions in the Police ordered by Lord Mayo in November 1869, when the magnitude of the financial emergency seems to have forced itself upon his mind. Fifteen English gentlemen of the high rank of Deputy Inspector-General, paid at the rate of £1500 a year and upwards, and about a hundred and five District Superintendents and Assistants, on an average of £500 a year each,—in all one hundred and twenty superior officers drawing salaries in the aggregate of about £80,000 per annum,—were marked down for summary removal.

If these reductions are carried out to the full extent originally ordered,—to which the Home Government is understood to have demurred,—it may well be doubted whether the efficiency of the Police will suffer in the slightest degree. Into the general merits of the Police under the new organisation, as a protective or as a detective body, we need not enter at present. No one who is at all acquainted with the opinions and feelings of the Natives, more especially as expounded in their own newspapers, both English and vernacular, will deny that it is an eminently unpopular body. It is not regarded as an “unspeakable blessing.” The former system of Police having failed, particularly in Bengal, changes far too sweeping were made, and instead of building on the old foundations, which we had damaged but not destroyed, of the village watchmen and the responsibility of the village authorities, to be secured by due remuneration, the usual panacea of rules and forms under highly paid European superintend-

ence was applied in wholesale fashion. The following extracts will suggest the possibility of dispensing with a large number of English officers without any very great loss or damage to the public service or to general content. Our first extract shall be from the Report on the Famine in Orissa, by Mr. George Campbell, now Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, dated the 26th of November 1867.

“The impression is very general that the appointments in the Bengal Police were somewhat hastily filled. It is certain that many of the European officers have no sufficient acquaintance with the language of the people among whom they are employed; some, I believe, have no acquaintance with it whatever. I was a member of the Board of Examiners (although I took no active part in the proceedings) when that body represented to the Lieutenant-Governor the failure of the officers of Police to pass the prescribed tests; and although instructions were then issued requiring the junior officers to qualify in future, I desire to take this opportunity of stating that, in my opinion, the Government of Bengal adopted a course very much to be regretted, when at the same time, on the mere recommendation of Lieutenant-Colonel Pughe, Inspector-General of Police, it exempted from examination a large number of the least qualified officers, and permitted them to be placed in the highest posts without the necessary qualifications. My impression is that the officer in charge of the Cuttack Police at the commencement of the famine was one of those exempted officers (although I cannot speak exactly on this last point), and he avowed himself wholly ignorant of the language of the people of his district.*

The next piece of testimony shall also come from a witness friendly to our administration in general, and to the Police Department in particular,—the *Calcutta Review*, most of the contributors to which belong either to the Civil Service or to the Army of Bengal.† The writer of the article to be quoted criticises the working of the new system, which had then been four years in operation, suggests one of the very measures that has just been ordered by Lord Mayo, the abolition of the rank of Deputy

* *Papers, Administration of Bengal*, 1868, p. 27.

† A reviewer in the number of the *Calcutta Review*, p. 476, we are about to quote, says —“It is no secret that to the young members of the Civil Service this *Review* is mainly indebted for its continued existence.”

Inspector-General, and says of the gentlemen holding that office, that "they are far less practised and capable, as officers, than their own subordinates whom they are expected to supervise;" that "there is no highly paid officer whose existence is so entirely unfelt and unnoticed as is the case with these Deputy Inspectors-General." "Their time," he adds, "is chiefly taken up in corresponding, reporting, and making returns." "On the whole," he continues, "we think we never knew either a more useless or more mischievous waste of public money than is incurred for these officers."* They remained in office, however, during the whole of Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence's Viceroyalty.

The reviewer, after noticing some "local and national" peculiarities which, in his opinion, impede the course of justice in India, proceeds thus.—

"These difficulties are further very materially increased, by the fact that the Police are managed and controlled by a few (a very much too small number), of foreigners, of different colour, religion, and language to their subordinates and the general community; who are quite curiously ignorant of the Natives, who have no intimate intercourse with them, know nothing of their inner life, habits, or feelings, and can't (as a *very* general rule), understand, or be understood by, any ordinary villager they may come across."†

The words in a parenthesis, ("a very much too small a number,") are very characteristic of the irresistible tendency of official life in India to foster, in spite of adverse experience, the ever increasing employment of English gentlemen in all the best offices. In the very sentence in which he admits their utter want of indispensable qualifications, this clever Bengal Civilian—for such he evidently is—proposes to place more of them in the Police. He proposes to abolish the rank of Deputy Inspector-General, but to bring in a larger number of young Englishmen in the lower grade of Assistant Superintendent, who may be trained in the Department. *Fiat experimentum in corpore vili*. In the following passages the reviewer tells us what have been some of the results of the actual experiment

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIV, 1866, p. 346, 7, 8. † *Ibid.*, p. 331.

under the new organisation of the Police as it exists at present.

"It is undeniable that the Police and the administration between them have made a criminal prosecution a burden of such a crushing weight, not only upon those who are connected with the trial, but also upon all the inhabitants of the place where the investigation is made, that it has become the one object of the whole population of Bengal, to attempt to hush up crime, to keep out the Police when possible, and, when it is not possible, to hush up each his own individual knowledge of it, in order that they may not undergo the severe misfortune of being required to appear as witnesses. The Police being met by a difficulty so great, and being at the same time compelled to detect crimes, took the one step that suggests itself to Native minds in such cases, and proceeded to extort their knowledge from the villagers by hard usage, in fact, by torture."

"The amount of consideration and deferential respect which has been thrust upon them lately, even the pretentiousness of their garb and of their semi-military training,—have conferred upon the new Police an arrogance and unwonted sense of power, which, it is much to be feared, have made them bolder in the abuse of power, while it has assuredly made the people more abject to them, than ever."*

The writer asks this question in the concluding paragraph of his essay :—

"Supposing that such a Committee were to be appointed to-morrow for Bengal, as was appointed formerly for the torture cases in Madras, is there any one now engaged in carrying on the government of the country who would not dread a fearful exposure?"†

Let us now glance at another "unspeakable blessing," mentioned by Mr. Mangles in the *Minute* already cited, that of "wise and fixed principles of law," as practically administered in our Courts of Justice. The late Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, to whose paper, published in the *Times* in March 1868, we have referred more than once, will not be considered as a malicious assailant of our system :—

"Our judicial system is most unpopular, with its long delays, its niceties, and complicated system and legal technicalities, and is very costly. It has been prematurely raised to a standard

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIV, 1866, p. 353.

† *Ibid.*, p. 368.

suited to European requirements, and uncongenial to the people, whose simple idea of justice is, that it should be prompt, cheap, and vigorous."

"Another cause of popular dissatisfaction is our constant call for witnesses from their remote homes, their delay and their scant compensation, or often no compensation at all."

Very similar strictures have recently fallen from another very competent and impartial observer, Mr. L. H. Ashburner, of the Bombay Civil Service, Magistrate of Khandaish.

"On the frontier of an ill-governed Native State, where the people are brought in more immediate contact with oppression and misgovernment, our system may have its advocates; but even there, for every instance of insecurity of life and property, the Patels will quote equally distressing cases of respectable families impoverished and ruined by the action of our Civil Courts, or of notorious murderers let loose upon society owing to some legal quibble. Not understanding the stringency of our rules of evidence, they attribute these failures of justice, which are every day becoming more common, to the corruption of the Judges."*

The oft repeated suggestion that our judicial system, "prematurely raised," as Sir Robert Montgomery says, "to a European standard," has introduced a train of moral and social evils among the people of India, is very forcibly stated, by an unexceptionable witness, in the following extract of a letter from Mr. H. C. Tucker, Commissioner of the Fifth Division, to the Sudder Board of Revenue, North Western Provinces, Agra; No. 606, dated 8th December, 1854 :—

"Our involved system of technical law leads to endless expensive and uncertain litigation; and all these evils are on the increase. Our whole system of Law, and Government, and Education, tends to make the Natives clever, irreligious, and litigious. No man can trust another. Formerly a verbal promise was as good as a bond. Then bonds became necessary. Now bonds go for nothing, and no prudent banker will lend money without receiving landed property in pledge."†

Mr. Tucker gives as his deliberate opinion and the result of his experience that in "the recently acquired Pun-

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 16.

† *Selections from the Records of Government North-West Provinces*, Part xxiv, Agra, 1856, p. 225.

jab, where the people have had little of our Law," they "are comparatively truthful and honest," but that "the population becomes worse and worse as you descend lower and lower to our old possessions of Calcutta and Madras."

It must not be supposed that because a regular code of law and procedure does not exist in unreformed Native States, a creditor or aggrieved person is necessarily left without any remedy except violence against the opposite party. Public opinion and social influence are much more potent there than in British territory, where hardly any distinction of rank is recognised, and where the pettiest official may override and supersede every sanction that the people have been accustomed to respect. Supported by their tenants, neighbours, and fellow-townsmen, the superior landholders, the head men of villages, the elders of tribes and castes, and, in some cases, religious teachers, with or without a Punchayat or jury of five, exercise an authority for the settlement of claims and the redress of wrongs that is not easily resisted or evaded. These customary jurisdictions, dependent on rough and anomalous means for enforcing their decrees, are of course irregular and uncertain in their action, but they can never furnish so cruel a weapon to the rich extortioner as our procedure, which enables him, as plaintiff or defendant, to pursue or retreat through several Courts, with an ultimate appeal, if the suit involves more than £1000, to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in London.*

* Why should a wealthy litigant be enabled to drag his opponent across a whole continent, a distance of thousands of miles, to England, and to force him to employ the most expensive process possible, in order to have another appeal? Would not litigants in India prefer perhaps an inferior quality of justice in the High Courts of the Presidencies, to justice administered by the first judges in the world in London? There is one class of cases, those in which the local Governments, or high officials, stand in the position of defendant, to which, in my opinion, the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee should be confined, and into this class should be admitted those matters of disputed succession, alleged lapse and escheat in reigning and mediatised families of sovereign rank, and cases raised between Native Princes and their feudatory Chieftains, which, often involving the interpretation of treaties, are considered as affairs or acts of "state", are excluded from the cognisance of any tribunal of appeal, and are summarily decided

There is another Department, the constant butt of ridicule in the Native Press of our Provinces for its costly inefficiency and elaborate waste, which would appear from the following passage in a Report by Colonel Daly, Political Agent at Gwalior, dated the 22nd of April 1868, not to be regarded as an "unspeakable blessing" by either the Princes or the people of Native States.

"It is quite on the cards that, with one of Scindia's capacity and temperament, Gwalior may one day be as conspicuous in the prosecution of public works as it is now for the absence of them. Unhappily, the daily experience of our own Public Works Department does not afford us much room for suggesting them to notice. The oppression which overtook the villages along the line of the Agra and Bombay road during its construction, has left a painful impression with Scindia and the people. I make no comment on the barracks and other buildings at Morar and the Fort; a full report of these works will be made by the Public Works Department."*

General Sir Mark Cubbon, who, with the assistance of one or two Engineers to guide the operations of his District officers and their Native subordinates, had covered Mysore with good roads before any British Province was equally well supplied, strongly objected, but in vain, to the introduction of the Public Works Department into the territories which were under his charge for a quarter of a century. There are now about thirty English gentlemen in Mysore, employed on very simple work in that Department on very handsome salaries, where two or three at the most would really be required, if any pains were taken to train Native Engineers, or even any encouragement offered for them to come forward.

In the *Bombay Gazette* of November 20th 1869, there is an article commenting on a striking letter that had then just appeared in the *Pioneer*, a journal published at Allahabad, not likely, the *Gazette* says, "to print malevolent insinuations on no sort of authority, or apparent authority."

by Political Agents, sure of support in the Foreign Department, or by the Government, and too frequently in a very unjudicial manner. These are the very cases that ought to be appealable to the Queen in Council.

* *Central India Report*, 1867-8, Appendix, p. xiv.

The letter purports to be written from actual experience obtained within the Department.

"The writer makes the following solemn declaration. He says —'I can in all truthfulness assert, after a most close connection with the Department for years, and without semblance of fear that my views could be controverted, that no Department under any Government could exhibit such reckless expenditure.'"

"He goes on to imply the existence of positive fraud. He asserts, not only that some men have charged one hundred per cent. more than others would have charged—not only that sums are paid far beyond the value of the work done—but that enormous sums have been charged for the repairs of a certain road, which road, nevertheless, was always out of repair. He intimates, more than once, that overseers have made fortunes."

It is quite unnecessary, in order to prove the notoriety of these scandalous administrative abuses, to cite the vernacular newspapers, or those printed in English under Native management, for we find very similar allegations made, about the same time, by the principal weekly paper of Calcutta. The *Friend of India*, in December 1869, "commends to the study of Colonel Strachey," Secretary to Government for Public Works, the following two facts :—

"The Calcutta Sailors' Home, built three years ago to a considerable extent out of charitable subscriptions, has already begun to give way owing to what we may call fraudulent beams. The second fact, which goes far to explain such scandal as this, is that a subordinate of the Public Works Department recently died worth several—we are assured, eight—lakhs of rupees" (£80,000). "He had been a private soldier and had made all his money in the Department."*

The *Times of India*, published at Bombay at about the same date as our last extract, warns the Government that public works must be constructed "on commercial principles," and that "even irrigation works and railways, like gold, may be bought too dearly." A correspondent declares, "after an experience of twenty-five years," that "no State can afford to build refrigerators in the shape of double-storied barracks,—patent producers of asthma, lumbago, and rheumatism,—costing lakhs of rupees, or to pour coin

* *Homeward Mail*, January 10th, 1870

into the hands of Native and European contractors to simply carry out the departmental rule—of useless expenditure and wanton waste of money.” The Editor attributes the shortcomings of the “costly military Engineers” employed in all the higher offices to “a want of insight, an habitual neglect of close supervision and independent check, with a deficiency in knowledge of details quite sufficient to account for the abuses and serious malversations charged against the lower ranks of the Department.”*

“Want of insight,” and “deficiency in knowledge of details,” are terms equally descriptive of the weak points in the qualifications of most English officers in India, and consequently of the Imperial Government, in almost every branch of administration. Having no social intercourse with the Natives, and taking little interest in their works and ways, the great majority of our officers are more or less at the mercy of their Native subordinates—usually of one or two in close attendance—for information on all matters of detail, of local circumstances and current events. The minority, more independent, more confident, more determined to judge for themselves, and to be guided by no one, perhaps, on the whole, mislead themselves more than they could have been misled.

Still maintaining my objections to over-centralisation and a straining after Procrustean uniformity, whether manifested in violent acts of annexation or in milder acts of legislation, I should say that, speaking generally, our Imperial work has been more efficient, our Imperial influence has been more beneficial, than our local work or our local influence. Local work can be better done by Natives than by Englishmen. Native talent can never be so well selected or so well applied to the work of local administration by the British Government as in a Native State.

And this will serve to reconcile an apparent contradiction that may have struck some of my readers as running throughout these pages. I have freely questioned the perfection, and cast doubt on the perfectibility of British administration as well as of British Government in India.

* Extracted from the *Asiatic*, December 22nd, 1869.

And yet I have taken as the chief sign and criterion of a Native State's progress in reform, that it has adopted to a greater or less extent our principles of government and our forms of administration.

This is because our principles are as good as ever, although our practice may have fallen off, or may have become, by force of altered circumstances, unsuitable for the time and inconsistent with our principles.

I do indeed believe that the work of government in our hands is declining, rather than rising, in efficiency and general repute, absolutely in some degree, but still more relatively, or with reference to the keener perceptions and more advanced capabilities of our political pupil. We should be proud, rather than jealous or apprehensive, of these results of our teaching and example. We ought not to be blind to the moral and intellectual growth that calls for a relaxation of discipline.

I believe, also, that the enactment of law, the organisation of procedure, and the submission of Government to its own laws and pledges, having been exhibited by us on a large scale, in supersession of the arbitrary and capricious methods which we found in force, the advantages of a rule of law and order are appreciated by a sufficiently large number of the governing classes of India to admit of its being introduced and enforced everywhere under the auspices of the Imperial Power. But while our general idea and plan of reducing Native institutions to a civilised shape has been almost always excellent, our changes have frequently been premature, too complete and too comprehensive. What we have gained in precision we have lost in flexibility and self-action.

Native States,—if tolerably well administered, sometimes when very badly administered,—are for the most part well and easily governed. British Provinces, with an elaborate and expensive administration, could not be governed at all without a formidable military force, always on the alert and frequently displayed.

The best proof possible of a Government being so far good as to be suitable and acceptable to the people, is that it can withstand and outlast its own bad administration.

The unreformed Native States of India are reproached, and justly, because the pay of their troops and establishments is always, as a matter of course, several months in arrears. That is bad administration. But good government, in some rude fashion or other, surmounts the difficulty, even when it has led, as it often does, to mutiny. The Prince himself comes forward; one or two petty officials are ostensibly dismissed or disgraced; a portion of the pay is distributed; a few presents of clothes are given, and quiet is restored. The constitution being sound, a speedy recovery is made from severe privations and accidents.

Our troops and civil establishments are paid monthly, with the most admirable regularity. That is good administration. But if we were to try the experiment, or be reduced to the necessity, of allowing pay to fall six months in arrears, we should find that good administration was all we had to rely on, and that when once that was interrupted there would be no government at all. The constitution is radically weak and unsound; the brilliant aspect is due to unhealthy repletion and the use of stimulants; a factitious appearance of strength is kept up only by the constant purveyance of costly provisions and exotic drugs, and by a complicated apparatus of artificial support. If the supplies should at any time be cut off, if the foreign support should be partially withdrawn, there would be imminent danger of collapse, or of some inflammatory eruption that could only be treated by blood-letting and other "heroic" remedies.

Mutiny or insubordination in our Native army, disaffection or conspiracy anywhere in the British Provinces of India, cannot be quelled or cured by conciliation and compromise, by the redress of wrongs or by gracious promises. Force and terror—stern repression and penal inflictions—are the only means by which we can touch that side of the Native character with which alone we come really in contact. The cynical assertion, frequently heard from Anglo-Indians, that Asiatics can only be ruled by fear, has much truth in it, with reference to existing relations between the races, but the truth is not for us either eulogistic or exculpatory.

And if any one should demur to these views, and claim for the British Government in India a higher share of moral authority, let him explain where it resides and how it is to be applied. By what operations, except military operations, does he conceive the British Government can oppose the disintegrating forces of ignorance, fanaticism, and wild ambition? How would he, for instance, meet an impending or incipient rebellion? Would he rely on Proclamations or General Orders? They did not produce much good in 1857. Not only did their persuasive effect amount to nothing, but their statements of fact were invariably disbelieved.

The general course and numerous incidents of the Rebellion served to bring out in strong relief the self-sustaining faculties of a Native State, and the vital support it can give to the Imperial Power, strikingly contrasted with the utter inability of our own administration, in District, Province, or Presidency, to stand its ground, unless backed by British troops, against an outburst of popular fury. A very competent authority, Sir Bartle Frere, late Governor of Bombay and now a Member of the Secretary of State's Council, has officially recorded his opinion that "no administration could have been more surprised by rebellion, none could have been more powerless to arrest or confront it, than the Government of the North-West Provinces in 1857."*

It would be too much to expect this eminent public servant,—conscious of great skill and knowledge acquired, of much good work performed, and of well merited honour gained in his past career, with a grand field of usefulness, and, perhaps, some still more splendid prize open to him in the future,—to interpret these political phenomena in anything like the way that I should, or to draw anything like the same inferences from them. To do so would probably seem to him almost an acknowledgment that his occupation was gone, that he had "scorned delights and lived laborious days" to very little purpose. And yet, what is the remedy he proposes to apply to those defects in the Government of the North-West Provinces that, in

* *Papers, Administration of Bengal*, 1868, p. 49.

his own words, "blinded it to the mine of popular discontent which so suddenly exploded"? How does he propose to endow the Lieutenant-Governor with that "sympathetic appreciation of what the people really in the long run desire, or will tolerate," which he believes to have been "the real source of the power" of Runjeet Singh and Dost Mohammed, which he justly declares to be "a more essential element in the composition of a successful despot," than even "a strong will,"* and which he evidently thinks we must not expect to find very often in the person of a British Lieutenant-Governor? A Council! Give him a Council such as those of Bombay and Madras. He has not, however, much confidence in the remedy he proposes. He is in the puzzled state, usual, and indeed inevitable, when an Anglo-Indian functionary considerably above the average calibre gets out of the groove of administration, and begins to think and talk like a statesman. The incompetence of the Agra Government in 1857, "cannot," he says, "be attributed to any want of ability in the Lieutenant-Governor or his advisers, for they were all among the ablest in India, and I do not say that a Governor and Council would have done better."† Still a Council might be an improvement. At any rate, he urges:—

"It cannot be said that the special form of Government in the North-West Provinces gave any sort of special facility in dealing with the Rebellion, and it is at least open to argument that the complacent acquiescence in the personal views of the head of the Government, where there is no one in authority to discuss them as a colleague, was a fatal element in blinding the Government."

He could, he says, name some men who, "from their accessibility and tact in eliciting opinions, would never be wrong as to the popular view of a question." "But such gifts as they possess are very rare." And he "knows nothing more likely to be fatal to our rule in India than the autocracy of an able, well-intentioned man, who has not this peculiar aptitude for divining the wants and wishes of the people."‡ Therefore, try a Council. If one "able, well-intentioned" man without this "rare gift,"

* *Papers, Administration of Bengal*, 1868, p. 50.

† *Ibid.*, p. 49.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

"this peculiar aptitude," will not do, associate three or four more of the same class with him as his colleagues. Perhaps one of them may by a happy chance possess that rare and peculiar aptitude. If not, his colleagues would be a check upon the Governor, and there would be less danger of "wanton change under the more elaborate form of government." "There can be no doubt," he continues, "that the tendency to such change, which is one of the crying evils in our modern Indian system, is seen in its most aggravated form where the Government is autocratic." I should have thought that there was very great doubt on this point. I should have supposed, on the contrary, that a tendency to such change, for want of "an appreciation of what the people really desire, or will tolerate,"—a tendency to over-legislation and over-regulation,—had been a much more "crying evil" under the elaborate forms of the Supreme Government than under the more autocratic institutions of the Punjaub and Central Provinces.

But I am more immediately concerned at present with that other capacity which we look for in a Government, and in which Sir Bartle Frere tells us that of Agra failed in 1857, the capacity of maintaining the "public peace," of "arresting and confronting rebellion." This is the fundamental duty of the Executive; and it is difficult to conceive from what incidents in the great crisis of 1857 Sir Bartle Frere has been led to suppose that the political vision of the Lieutenant Governor of Agra would have been prolonged or his hands strengthened, if two or three more gentlemen of the Bengal Civil Service had been with him as his Councillors. No Governor-General was ever surrounded by more able Councillors than was Lord Canning at the outbreak of the Mutinies. Yet assuredly that excellent and lamented public servant, Mr. John Colvin, who was then Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Provinces, was not, so far as we can judge from the records of the time, one whit more "surprised" by the Rebellion, one whit more "blinded" to the tremendous proportions it was about to assume, one whit more "powerless to arrest and confront it," without British troops, than were the Viceroy and his Councillors.

What they wanted then, what they want now, what we shall always want in India, is a vital communication with the conservative interests and free intelligence of the country. And this we can only secure through the Native Princes. We want the Native Princes much more than they want us. We want them for the discipline and the education of two hundred millions of Asiatics. We can instruct and manage the two hundred Princes, their families and followers; we cannot sway the millions without the aid and good will of their natural leaders. No British Collector, no Commissioner, no Lieutenant Governor, no Councillor, however able, however experienced, however highly educated,—though strained and sifted by a dozen successive competitions,—can ever maintain order or propagate reform as can be done by a Native Prince, however ignorant, whom we have rendered amenable to our purpose. And there is no necessity that Native Princes should be ignorant. If most of them are so, it is only another proof of our negligence.

There is no intention here of asserting that Native Princes or Native States are all that they ought to be, or that they no longer need the restraint of British political supremacy. My object in the evidence and illustrations I have adduced has been rather to prove the inherent capabilities of improvement displayed by many Native States, than to affirm the great progress made by any one of them. My opinion is very decided that not even the most advanced Native State in India has yet arrived at that development of reformed institutions, to which with our aid and guidance it might very easily attain.

The evils arising from the systematic neglect of our Imperial duties of instructing and reforming the allied and protected States of India, had been a frequent topic of complaint and remonstrance for years before Lord Dalhousie jumped to the conclusion that destruction was the only remedy for them. When the objections made by the Court of Directors to the Oude Treaty of 1837 were under the consideration of the Supreme Council, Mr. T. C. Robertson wrote as follows in a Minute dated the 28th of January, 1839.—

“Our persevering indifference towards the lavish profusion and other extravagancies of the late Ruler of that State, was, I apprehend, regarded by the Native community, more especially the Mahomedan portion, as flowing from any rather than disinterested motives, and was even imputed by many to a crafty design of bringing his dominions into a condition to afford a pretext for adding them to our own.”*

Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, imputed the disorders that had crept into the administration of that State to the want of “certainty and permanence” in the control of our Government. He speaks of “the oscillation of the *Resident’s* policy and system”, in a style that clearly indicates that our Government had no system or policy whatever of its own, and furnished its diplomatic agents with no definite instructions as to their control over the local administration.

“The Chief who to-day is subject to the control of a strict Resident, is amused by his flatterers with the prospect of a successor of a wholly different character. The advice of to-day is disarmed of half its force if it can be expected to be followed by a different course of policy on the morrow; and when the season of indifference and ease has produced its natural effects of misgovernment and debt, the reaction must needs be violent and doubly distasteful to an arbitrary Prince, on the appointment of an officer impelled by duty to enforce a general reform.”

“The main cause of the difficulty lies in the system of filling up diplomatic appointments. It seems to be quite a chance if the system of the officer who precedes, and of the officer who follows, agrees. The Rajah and his Ministers speculate on this difference of action or opinion. Honesty is lukewarm and roguery is fearless, as there is no certainty or no permanence in the policy to be enforced.”†

In a somewhat later despatch he writes:—

“My own opinion is that, had the same course of interference been carried out from 1840 to 1853 in a uniform, kind and effective manner, much or most, if not all, of this trouble would have been avoided. The argument of the Natives with whom I have frequently conferred on this subject is, that the British Residents at Nagpore should participate in the blame charged to the Rajah by myself: for if the same system of advice and check which was contemplated by the last Treaty had been carried out from first

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 52.

† *Papers, Berar*, 1854, p. 17.

to last, the Rajah would never have been tempted into habits of indolence and avarice.”*

And here are some of Lord Metcalfe’s reflections on the reforming measures which had been introduced in the Nizam’s Dominions by his own influence as Resident :—

“ It is remarkable that our interference was then for the first time exercised with a benevolent view to the protection and happiness of the Nizam’s subjects. Every former act of interference, however subversive of the independence of the Hyderabad State, was dictated solely by a regard for our own interests, without any care or thought for the welfare of the people whom we had delivered up to a Ruler of our own selection.”†

These operations were suspended with strange alacrity at the first suggestion of a young and inexperienced Prince, in 1829 ; and the positive refusal to renew them in 1851, has already fallen under our observation in these pages. We have also remarked upon Sir William Sleeman’s appeal with regard to the Kingdom of Oude, fruitlessly continued through five years.‡

Those who opposed the policy of annexation in the heyday of its apparent success were, for the most part, the very men who had contended and laboured most earnestly for the welfare of the people of India, who had insisted most strongly on the maintenance of British supremacy, and on the necessity of its being exercised for the good of all classes. But they believed that British supremacy would be weakened by bad faith. They would have promptly employed that supremacy to reform the institutions of allied and friendly States ; while Lord Dalhousie held aloof, refusing to interfere, because no immediate material profit could be reaped, but watching for some trumpery pretext to destroy and despoil.

I do not shut my eyes to the fact that counsels more just and more generous now prevail, that the leading men of both parties, in and out of office, have declared against further acquisitions of territory, and have recognised the political prudence of maintaining Native States. But these declarations have generally been somewhat vague

* *Further Papers, Berar*, 1856, p. 7.

† *Metcalfe’s Papers*, p. 225

‡ *Ante*, p. 13

and indeterminate. Even the opponents of annexation, instead of cordially recognising a reformed Principality as at once the most progressive and permanent result possible of British power in India, have seemed rather to look upon each Native State as a sort of privileged Alsatia which it was advisable to tolerate, partly out of respect for rights of prescription and compact, partly as a foil to our well-regulated method, and as a field for ill-regulated ambition. There is no element in this contemptuous tolerance that can form an absolute safeguard against the first plausible temptation. Several refuted heresies showed great vitality a few years ago, when the State of Mysore narrowly escaped extinction,—for instance, the doctrine of “lapse”, and the perpetuity of British management,—while, the corporate character of a State being completely overlooked, it was held that a Native Prince, even in his dying agony or his dotage, might lawfully bequeath his Sovereignty to the Paramount Power, and that the acceptance of such a bequest was quite consistent with Imperial duty and dignity.

I do not forget or undervalue the good work that has already been accomplished, and is in course of accomplishment, in the very direction recommended in these pages. What I wish to point out is, that this good work has been done, and continues to be done, on no principle and under no system,—that the reform of a Native State is taken up by mere chance, as it is forced on the consideration of our Government by the succession of a minor, by the violence, vice, or incompetence of a reigning Prince,* or by the exceptional combination of a thoroughly competent Resident with an enlightened Minister or Sovereign.

In order that a Resident should be thoroughly competent, it is not enough that he should be able and active: he must also be genial, patient, and persuasive. He may very easily be too active. If he possesses the requisite tact and talent for the noble task before him, the mere fact of his representing the Imperial Power will clothe him with sufficient influence, without its being necessary

* As in the recent cases of Tonk and Ah Raypore

that his interference should be unpleasantly felt at every turn. He should learn that his office is to teach and induce the Native Government to work well,—not to do the work himself, or even to correct it when wrongly done. He should sink his personality and efface himself, rather than allow any rumour of undue pressure or direct action on his part to impair the authority of the Native Sovereign or his Minister. He should never be tempted impatiently to assume, after the manner of Mr. Mangles and the Civil Service in general, that the work of government and administration must always be done in a superior style, and be more of an “unspeakable blessing” to the people, at the hands of educated Christian gentlemen like “Cubbon, Bowring, or Charles Saunders”, than at the hands of a Hindoo Prince or Mussulman Minister. He should understand that when the new system involves innovations on national habits and customs, the remodelling of old institutions, and the introduction of new forms, the question is not so much what men can do the work best, as who are the best men to do it. The foreign doctor may deserve all the credit of detecting the disease and prescribing the medicine, and yet the Native practitioner, simply because he is a Native, may alone possess the power of removing popular prejudices, of making the new treatment palatable, and giving it vogue, and of securing a permanent cure by appropriate diet and regimen.

Better men cannot be found to carry out a policy of Imperial reconstruction than those who are at present actively employed in the civil and political offices of India. I am not a believer in the universally diffused capacity for administration and government of a “Service”, whether recruited by patronage or by competition; but if we would confine ourselves to our appropriate and legitimate sphere, there would be no lack of well-qualified agents. All that they require are clear instructions on the subject of Imperial policy. When the national instinct is roused and the national voice has spoken,—when broader views of our mission and our duties are expounded by the highest authorities in Great Britain,—administrative power and administrative loyalty will not be wanting, either in the

central executive Council or among the scattered subordinate officers, for the fulfilment of the national decree. But no broader views will ever originate in Calcutta.

Law reformers do not look for much help or countenance from the great body of judges, advocates, and solicitors, or ecclesiastical and educational reformers from the bishops and beneficed clergy. Old soldiers and sailors are generally opposed to all military and naval novelties. The cause of local self-government never meets with much favour from members of the permanent Civil Service. No one likes to find that his craft and mystery is to lose its value, or to be thrown open to general competition. In India the natural reluctance of a privileged profession to sacrifice its pride and its interests, to relinquish power, place, or patronage, to learn a new procedure and assume new relations towards the outer world, is heightened by strong distinctions of race, creed, and colour. The national conscience and absolute decision of the United Kingdom must overcome these obstacles. The public opinion of Great Britain translated into precepts by the Secretary of State, with or without some Parliamentary action, would soon suffice to modify and transform the temper of the Indian Services and of the Viceregal Government. The more liberal spirit must come from home. It will never spring up unbidden in official circles.

A remark officially recorded two years ago by Colonel Hopkinson, Commissioner of Assam, is here very much to the point :—

“ Lastly, I would observe that if endeavours are ever made to develop the moral nature of the Natives after the fashion of the Anglo-Saxon race, it will be found that for the most part they originate either in England or with Englishmen out of the official pale in India.”*

The besetting sin of every organised body of professional functionaries,—the desire to magnify its own importance and power,—affects most deeply the superintendence of Native States by the Calcutta Foreign Office and its Agents. Instead of strengthening the Prince's hands and

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 16

guiding his steps, the official tendency is always to weaken his authority and to fetter his movements.

It ought to be clearly understood, for instance, that the fault of the Oude Government for many years before the annexation, was not that of tyrannical oppression, but rather a certain weakness and looseness of administration, and a total incapacity to cope with the great landholders, all being due in a great measure to our own derelictions and neglect. Far from its being true, as has been often alleged, that the Oude Government was enabled to be oppressive with impunity in consequence of British military support, Sir William Sleeman declares that its inability to control the more powerful feudatories arose from that support not being given to which the Government was justly entitled. From time to time, he tells us, Regiments had been withdrawn from several points, which "*to do our duty honestly by Oude*", we ought to restore.*

"The British force in Oude is much less than it was when the Treaty of the 11th September, 1837, was made, and assuredly less than it should be with a due regard to our engagements and the Oude requirements."

"Our exigencies became great with the Affghan war, and have continued to be so from those wars which grew out of it with Gwalior, Scinde, and the Punjaub; but they have all now passed away, and those of our humble Ally should be no longer forgotten or disregarded. Though we seldom give him the use of troops in the support of the authority of his local officers, still the prestige of having them at hand, in support of a just cause, is unquestionably of great advantage to him and to his people, and this advantage we cannot withhold from him with a due regard to the obligations of solemn treaties."†

The very same weakness in the Head of the State, curable only by Imperial intervention, is the main obstacle to improved government in the larger Principalities of Rajpootana, especially in Joudpoor and Oodeypoor. There the great feudatories, regarding the Sovereign as little more than *primus inter pares*, claim unlimited sway within their own estates, resent all judicial or executive interference, and deny all right of appeal against their

* *Sleeman's Oude*, vol. 1, p. 136. See also vol. 1, p. lxiv, lxv.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 200.

acts and orders. Colonel Keatinge, the present Agent to the Governor-General in Rajpootana, one of the most distinguished and accomplished officers in India, gave the following strong hint on the subject in a recently published Report :—

“ Stagnant as no doubt the condition of society is in Native States, there are Chiefs who desire reform, but the opposition they meet from their nobles is so serious, that they can seldom accomplish much. I am convinced that the ancient feudal system of the Rajpoots cannot exist in close contact with the civilisation from the West, which now surrounds it. Before long it will, I apprehend, be necessary for Government to recognise openly this difficulty, to collect reliable information on the subject, and to promulgate general rules regarding the extent to which it expects nobles in their different degrees to render obedience to their Chiefs. At present, neither the Chiefs, the nobles, nor even the Political staff, have a clear understanding on this subject.”

Unfortunately there have been very few officers in the Political department during the last twenty years, and there are very few now, who have adopted the enlightened and far-seeing views to which Colonel Keatinge has given expression. The Foreign Office at Calcutta, from which the Residents and Political Agents must take their cue and from time to time draw inspiration, though greatly restrained and softened of late by home influence, still seems to treat every spontaneous effort of Native statesmanship in a sub-acid and slightly contemptuous tone. Native Princes and Ministers may feel themselves tolerably secure from total abolition, but they are still pretty sure to be snubbed and humiliated whenever they presume to display the slightest originality of thought or independence of character, to turn their attention towards any administrative change that has not been suggested by the British representative, and, in particular, to ask for Imperial aid or permission for any extension or consolidation of their authority. The predilections of the Department are all the other way,—towards the extension of its own direct authority. Every petty Chieftain in feudal dependence on a Native State, is a special object of interest to the Political Agent. With or without the existence or

semblance of a British guaranty,—originally intended to secure him from confiscation and oppression, not to exempt him from service and obedience to his lawful Suzerain,—the Native Prince's feudatory is made a virtual feudatory of the British Government. His customary jurisdiction within his own estate becomes inviolable and unchangeable in extent and consequence, free from any visitation and review by the Sovereign, but subject to an appeal to the Political Agent, and under his general supervision.

The subversion of the Prince's rule, and substitution of our official supremacy, over a large number of his vassal Chieftains, has proceeded to a greater or less extent, with results more or less injurious, and more or less easily remediable, in various Native States, according to local circumstances and customs, and according to the notions of the particular British officer who was in power at some critical period. For although ready enough to support and carry out the proposals and decisions of its Agents, our Government has never, so far as I can ascertain, laid down any principles for their guidance, or appeared to encourage any plan except that of acquiring as much direct power as possible by any available means. In some cases, as in Rajpootana, where our control is perhaps the least stringent, the semi-independence of the more powerful feudatories is of ancient origin, has always been—if not so decided and unquestionable as at present,—of a very substantial character, and could not now be peacefully restricted or modified without Imperial interference. In others it has been of our creation, or strengthened and confirmed by our connivance and approval. In more than one instance tribute and service due from a feudatory to his Native Suzerain have been diverted from the legitimate channel and appropriated by our Government.

Apart from any consideration of the wrong and loss inflicted, and of the general deterioration of sovereign authority by the fact and rumour of repudiated allegiance, it must be at once obvious that in territories traversed and intersected by many separate jurisdictions, great and even insurmountable obstacles are raised against effectual administrative reform. Were there no other objection,

it ought to be enough to point out that the Ruler of a State of moderate size may be able to secure the services of highly educated men for judicial posts and other important offices, while no such help could by any possibility be obtained by a petty Chieftain, whose income would in many cases not exceed £500 a year, and who would frequently be himself destitute of even the rudiments of an Indian education.

In consequence, as it would seem, of the scandals and loud complaints caused by the misgovernment and misconduct of the Maharajah of Joudpoor,—misconduct that would almost have justified his deposition,—the Government of India turned its attention in the middle of 1869 towards the condition of Rajpootana. Some well intended though imperfect measures for suspending personal rule in Joudpoor were ordained, but nothing permanent, nothing going to the root of the evil,—central weakness and general irresponsibility. The only additional result of these deliberations was the appointment of six more Assistant Political Agents. Six fortunate English officers, not selected for any special aptitude, merely appointed by virtue of patronage or by dint of their own pertinacious importunity, are sent to reside at the capitals of as many Principalities, whence they will write elaborate reports to their official superior. We hear not a word of any statesmanlike instructions or counsels addressed either to the Governor-General's Agent or to the Princes themselves, or of any general measures for initiating progressive reformation. Not a thought seems to have been given to an instrumentality that has been hitherto entirely neglected, by which we could most effectually penetrate into the inmost recesses of Native Courts,—Native agency, carefully selected and educated, properly paid, trusted and honoured.

Until a policy of reconstructive reform to be applied to the internal wants and resources of each Native State, is authoritatively inculcated from home, the Calcutta Foreign Office will assuredly persist in its policy of insatiable patronage, barren criticism, and irritating encroachments. The disorder to be cured being beyond all doubt or dispute,

the Government of India, instead of trying to improve the constitution, can think of no treatment but blisters and restraint, will continue to surround the patient with officious nurses and ignorant medical students, when one skilful practitioner, fully empowered to act, would soon establish the regularity of every function and the free movement of every limb.

Provided the Government is so organised as to be no longer entirely dependent for its efficiency on the personal qualities of the Prince or his Minister, a Native State cannot be made too free or too strong. If we could only realise this truth with special reference to the military resources and requirements of India, we might find therein a satisfactory solution of that much disputed problem,—how to maintain a Native army of sufficient strength in safe and responsible hands.

Those officers in the British army who have been most successful and distinguished in the command of Native troops,—unequalled as leaders of such troops in war,—must for ever be, as they were seen to be during the mutinies of 1857, completely divided in thought, feeling, and interests from the Sepoys, and practically unacquainted with their hopes and fears, their objects, and their projects. They cannot undertake to be responsible, and they cannot be held responsible, for the conduct of their men at any period of great religious or political excitement. At the moment of critical urgency their detective insight would fail, and their controlling influence would be at its lowest point.

But the most perfect controlling influence is ready to our call and open to our supervision, if we only choose to use it. The military resources of India and of the Empire might be husbanded with greater care and kept more within reach, the force required on a peace footing might be organised and disposed more advantageously and more economically, if in the fulness of time which has now arrived, we were to commence by judicious degrees the process of reversing the Subsidiary system of the Marquis Wellesley,—restoring and transferring to Native States, in consideration of military service, territories that would

be no loss to us. The gain in consolidated strength and reduced charges, would far more than compensate for the nominal sacrifice of revenue.

The troops of dependent Sovereigns, so long as their pay, regularly disbursed, does not unduly encroach on the local finances, cannot be made too efficient. Native troops, properly organised, and subject to Imperial inspection, cannot be kept under any control equally effective with that of a Native Prince, whose personal and hereditary ties and engagements constitute a chain of subordination and responsibility to the Paramount Power, more clearly defined and more easily enforced than any that has ever yet existed, or can be devised.*

We need have no suspicion of the visible armies of all the Native Sovereigns of India. Not one of them has the slightest wish to measure his strength against ours. They are neither willing nor able to combine against us. So long as we can see their little armies, we know where to have them, in case of any unavoidable collision or unexpected contumacy. It is far better that the warlike elements of the population shall be organised and disciplined under responsible leaders, than that they should be compressed or driven out of sight into predatory courses or hidden conspiracy. We cannot rely too much on the assurance contained in Lord Canning's last letter to General Sir Mark Cubbon, dated the 24th of November, 1860 :—

“I have no doubt that the policy of disruption and separation was the right one fifty years ago, when the Rohillas and Mahrattas possessed armies and artillery which they could increase at pleasure without our consent, and, indeed, without our knowledge. But now it is quite different. These Chiefs can scarcely cast a gun,—they certainly could not equip it unknown to us. They feel their dependence on us, since 1857, more than ever. We have nothing to fear from them individually, if we treat them rightly; while they have individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account.”

The following narrative will serve to show how the professional rulers of India, when relieved for a time from

* Appendix B.

the check and restraint of a British statesman as Viceroy, relapse into their narrow views, reject and despise the influence deemed invaluable by Lord Canning, refuse to turn it to any account at all, and do their best to destroy or pervert it.

In the worst days of the Rebellion of 1857 the chief obstacle to the free exercise of the Maharajah Scindia's authority on our side, the chief support of the turbulent party around him, consisted of the Gwalior Contingent, a force complete in itself,—Horse, Foot, and Artillery,—with its own arsenal, stores, and cash-chest, raised and disciplined by British officers, according to what used to be considered the only *safe* plan for organising Native troops. The expense of this force was imposed upon certain districts assigned to our management by the Gwalior State under the Treaty of 1844, when its unmanageably large Army had been disbanded after Lord Ellenborough's campaign. At a very early period of the outbreak the Gwalior Contingent mutinied, some of the English officers being murdered. The mutineers, nearly ten thousand strong, of all arms, left their cantonments, preserving their military order under chosen leaders, and thronged, clamorous and wild with excitement, around the Maharajah Scindia's Palace, calling on him to lead them to Delhi. The brave young Prince confronted this formidable host, humoured them and temporised with them, since he could not fight them,—though he tried that also at last, and failed; he kept them idle and harmless for months at Gwalior, until Delhi was taken, and after marching on Cawnpore and holding General Windham at bay, the mutineers of the Gwalior Contingent, still a compact body, were at last routed by Lord Clyde.

It is quite clear that but for the contagion of our revolted Sepoys, the Maharajah Scindia could have easily kept even the most violent of his own people quiet, and that he could have kept the Contingent quiet also, if it had ever been under his command. At an advanced stage of the Rebellion, his own troops, though quite as ill-disposed towards us as our mutineers, were in a great measure obedient to the Maharajah's orders, so far at least as

to be inactive and innocuous: while the men of the Gwalior Contingent, brought up under British discipline, from which they had broken loose, set him at defiance, and took the field against us. As there was no doubt or question of the loyalty and steadfastness of this excellent Prince, which had been tried severely enough,—Scindia having perilled his life in our cause with conspicuous gallantry on several occasions,—the wisest and most natural policy would have been by every possible means to increase his influence, and strengthen his hands within his own dominions. Such, in fact, was Lord Canning's policy. Such was not the policy of Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence.

On the re-establishment of order, the Gwalior Contingent having been wiped out, its several posts and military duties were taken up by regular British troops, and by the Maharajah's augmented forces. As the Contingent system had manifestly failed in this instance, a new Treaty was concluded, ratified by Lord Canning on the 12th December, 1860, under which certain pecuniary advantages were conferred on the Gwalior State, and its military force, restricted under the Treaty of 1844, might be raised to the limit of "5000 drilled" (Infantry) "soldiers, 6000 Sowars" (troopers), and "36 guns with 360 gunners."*

Scindia, who is described as being a born soldier, with a remarkable talent for military organisation and evolutions, well pleased with the concessions of the Treaty of 1860, had taken full advantage of them to indulge his martial tastes. The greater part of his little army, the "*drilled soldiers*" permitted by the new Treaty, were massed at his capital under his own eye; and here, in unsuspecting complacency, he invited the Political Agent to witness a grand review of all his troops. Whether this officer or the Viceroy first took fright, does not appear, but the immediate result was an absolute order, in the form of a polite letter from the Governor-General to the Maharajah, desiring that his little Army should at once be broken up, the several corps dispersed about the coun-

* Article ix of the Treaty of 1860; *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864 (London, Longmans), vol. iv, p 274.

try, and that no such large assemblage of troops should again take place.

We learn from the *Report of the Central India Agency* for 1866-7,* that the measures for the reduction and dispersion of these troops were taken in February, and "a full and detailed report of the circumstances was furnished" in a despatch dated 15th March, 1867. The Agent to the Governor-General says (para. 62, p. 13), "it would be hardly possible to overstate the soreness caused by the check that has thus been given to the indulgence of his" (Scindia's) "passion for military organisation and parades, and of his desire to keep his whole Force with this object at the capital under his personal control and command".

He continues thus (para. 63) :—

"I will only add that this result, however to be lamented, was altogether inevitable; and that the necessity for the adoption of the measures under advertence being deemed imperative under the circumstances, no consideration that I am aware of could have broken, or even mitigated, the effects of the blow to His Highness. Certainly no effort was spared by either the Political Agent or myself with this object."

It cannot be considered wonderful after this, that the Agent (para. 65 to 68, pp. 13, 14), while "cordially admitting" Maharajah Scindia's "friendly personal bearing," declaring his Highness to be "accessible and courteous, and prepared to discuss most subjects in a pleasant way, and to listen with attention to the arguments addressed to him", and giving his testimony to "the Maharajah's respect for the authority of the British Government", should still find that the Prince is now and then "suspicious and distrustful", and sometimes "considers the intervention of the British Government, or its officers, unwarrantable". How could it be otherwise while Imperial supremacy was exerted for his personal discomfiture in a manner so offensive and vexatious?

It would be difficult to conceive a measure more miserable and more unmeaning. It might indeed be urged that such peremptory interference was inconsistent with

* Published by authority, Calcutta, 1868.

the engagements between the British Government and that of Scindia. The Treaty of 1860, which limits the number of troops, permits no control over their location or distribution; while, in Article VIII of the Treaty of 1804, confirmed by every subsequent engagement, it is expressly stipulated that "no officer of the Honourable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharajah's Government";* and Article IV of the Treaty of 1817, confirmed and declared to be "binding" in the Treaty of 1860, pronounces the Maharajah to be "the undisputed master of his own troops and resources".† No stress need be laid upon these conditions; they are only to be taken as a starting-point; for undoubtedly, the Paramount Power, responsible for the peace of the Empire, cannot be bound by the strict letter of Treaties, when the public safety is endangered, and immediate action may be required to check hostile intrigue or dangerous excitement. Nor is any account or explanation of suspicions and precautions due to the minor State. But such coercive action, equivalent to open war against a Power of equal standing, ought to be very sparingly used, and only in case of urgent necessity. Sir John Lawrence could allege no such necessity for interfering with Scindia's legitimate authority over his own troops, within his own territories. He manifested groundless mistrust of a subordinate Ally before all India. Nothing could have been more impolitic or more ungracious. It was just the old leaven of the permanent official, the characteristic disease of the Bengal Civilian,—a sort of fussy jealousy, always sure to be roused by the portentous phenomenon of any Native, whether Prince or peasant, presuming to act or think for himself.

Even if there had been any cause or ground for mistrust, it was most indiscreet and undignified to show it. The action of Sir John Lawrence seems to have involved every fault that should be avoided in dealing with the dependent States. It betrayed petty suspicions and inglorious apprehensions, unworthy of the Imperial Power. It violated a Treaty,—thereby shaking respect for the

* *Collection of Treaties*, vol iv, p 236.

† *Ibid.*, p. 272.

solemn engagements on which the moral authority of our Government depends, not only in the particular State injured, but in every State throughout India. It tended to alienate an able and estimable Prince, and to make British supremacy hateful and offensive in his councils, and among all his compeers. By an affront so galling, and so publicly administered, aimed at what was known to be the Maharajah's special pride and tenderest point, his influence must have been weakened generally in his own dominions, and that of the malcontent party everywhere enhanced. The influence of the Maharajah, faithfully and beneficially exerted on our side in the last great crisis, has been weakened exactly where, judging from the experience of those days, it most deserved strengthening,—his personal and undivided command over his own troops.

Having thus lowered at one stroke the moral power of Great Britain, and of a most useful and deserving friend, what positive result did Sir John Lawrence obtain? None except that of having made himself intensely disagreeable. There could be no actual *danger* or *menace* to British supremacy in the encampment of our Ally's small Army,—a mere Division of second-rate Sepoys after all,—at his capital. The idea is ridiculous. He did not in the least diminish the physical force available for bad purposes within or without Scindia's territories. He weakened the Maharajah's controlling influence; he certainly gained none for any British authority. He probably offended and disgusted an intelligent and high-spirited Prince; he assuredly pleased nobody whose goodwill or good opinion was worth having.

What ought to have been done under the circumstances, is obvious. On receiving the Resident's report of the unlooked for efficiency and smartness of Scindia's troops, a Viceroy whose ideas of Imperial statesmanship could rise above those of our own military readiness and administrative tidiness, would have grasped at once at the opportunity of raising the self-respect of a well-disposed Prince, and of promoting substantial and solid progress in one of the largest Native States. He would have congratulated and complimented the Maharajah on having

commenced of his own accord the reform of his establishments by that of his Army, which he rejoiced to hear was now in a high state of discipline; and he would then have suggested some other public department, organised on a faulty principle, where improvements, hinted or sketched in outline, might be introduced with great advantage to the people, and with great honour to his Highness's name. The administrative and executive reform of a Native State is not a plant that can grow to its full size in a day. Tact and cordiality, genial confidence, and warm appreciation of small beginnings, may make the plant strike deep root. The cold shade and rough usage to which official cultivation has been of late confined, can only stunt the growth, corrupt the soil, and poison the atmosphere.

No one can fail to observe how powerful a lever to move the mass of prejudice and ignorance that obstructs the progress of India, is placed in our hands by the possession of so much superfluous and unprofitable territory. Under no pressing necessity to part with it, under no obligation to confer any portion of it on any particular Prince, the Imperial Power could, in every case of transfer, impose its own conditions. A certain proportion of the Indian debt would have to be paid off or assumed by the enlarged feudatory after fair calculation and arrangement; while the advantages gained by the Imperial Government would be found not only in the riddance of so much dead-weight, but also in the reduction of establishments, and in the prospective diminution in the annual tribute of pensions, furlough allowances, passage money of troops, and other Home charges.

By the gradual and more perfect formation of India into a great Vassal Empire, in the true sense of the term, the Imperial Power would gain strength at home and abroad, and relief from the ever present possibility of hideous disaster and disgrace. With the very doubtful exception of the small class that is supposed to profit directly by Indian patronage, no class of our countrymen would lose anything. The interest of the British nation in the annual provision made for some hundreds of young gentlemen,

and the fortunes and pensions acquired by some scores of retired officials, is of very circumscribed importance, of infinitesimal value, when compared with its interest in the development of the energies, in the cultivation of the tastes and desires of an immense and intelligent population occupying an inexhaustible field of producing and purchasing power.

The Imperial Government would still exclusively conduct the external relations of the Empire; control and restrict the political intercourse between the States. Our troops would visit and occupy, at pleasure, any and every place and post throughout the land. The military force of every minor State would be strictly subordinate and auxiliary, some Native Princes and Chieftains holding Her Majesty's commission, and certain Imperial roads and fortresses being specially entrusted to their charge, for which, as well as for the general efficiency, good conduct and discipline of their Contingents, they would be held personally and politically responsible. No customs or transit-duties could be levied without Imperial concurrence. By her treaty-right of authoritative counsel the Imperial Power could modify and direct the institutions of every State. Surely here are some securities both for order and progress. Surely here there will be full scope for British statesmanship, ample space for British energy and enterprise.*

Our advocacy of an Imperial system of instructed and superintended self-development for India, in contradistinction to a policy of territorial possession and direct administration, is sometimes met with objections which deserve to be stigmatised as absolutely truculent, and worthy only of the dark ages. It has been said that the British nation rules India by right of conquest, that we are the conquerors of the country, and are, therefore, fully warranted and justified in extracting from India such profits, in exercising such patronage, and in assuming such privileges and pre-eminences, all for the special advantage

* It has been most gratifying to me to observe that, however much the policy I have advocated for many years may have been misunderstood in some quarters, it has met with intelligent and temperate appreciation in those English and vernacular journals which represent the higher class of educated natives of India,—see Appendix H.

of the dominant race, as may seem for the time being convenient and attainable. It may not be now expedient, perhaps it would not be strictly justifiable, to impose a palpable tribute, but contributions may be, directly and indirectly, levied upon India, over and above what is absolutely required for its administration, in order to relieve British taxpayers, to provide lucrative employment for our sons, and to enrich our traders and manufacturers. These contributions are to be measured only by our discretion, and limited only by our magnanimity. Some of us, speaking of the nation as Lord Clive did for himself, seem to be astonished at our own moderation.

“No!”—say the able editors of the Anglo-Indian press, representing the Services and the British mercantile community,—“do not let the educated Natives deceive themselves. The future is not for them. We are by no means trustees; we are conquerors, and entitled by virtue of that position to study our own interests in all our executive and legislative action quite as much as the interests of the people of India. We are not going to rule the country merely for the benefit of the conquered, to give them gradually a larger share in the government, and to hand it over to them entirely when they think they can undertake it. Not at all,—we shall keep it for ourselves as long as we choose, and as long as we keep it we shall try to make it as profitable to ourselves as we can.”

All this appears to me not only very erroneous, but very stupid and very shallow. Those principles of government must be shallow and stupid that are based on contempt for the governed, and find expression in cynical insolence.

Whether India can properly be said to have been conquered by Great Britain is open to very great question. Some of its Provinces,—for example those which formed part of the dominions of Tippoo Sultan and of the Peishwa,—came into our possession by conquest. But in each of the wars which led to these acquisitions Native Princes were our Allies, and shared in the partition of the conquered territories.* Many minor Chieftains assisted on

* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864, vol. v, pp. 4, 6, 7.

our side, and a large number of Natives of India fought in our ranks. Other Provinces were acquired by cession or exchange under Treaties with Native Sovereigns with whom we were at peace, and with some of whom we had never been at war. It were well if certain other Provinces now in our possession *had* been conquered, for there cannot be a more clear and explicit title to sovereignty than that of conquest confirmed by treaty; but in the cases to which I refer,—of which only one of great importance, the Carnatic, need be mentioned,—territories are now held and administered by the British Government solely as the silent result of breach of trust and broken treaties, without any visible process or public proclamation whereby a title might be acquired or even asserted.

But it really matters nothing to our argument whether India is correctly described as a conquered country or not. Neither in International Law as expounded by the old jurists, nor in modern treatises on the same subject, is any effect of conquest alleged except that of giving a good title to sovereignty and dominion. The effect of conquest is in its essence transitory and investitive. It simply denotes the mode of acquisition. Conquest does not impair the obligations of political ethics, destroy rights and duties, or set up a peculiar set of slavish relations between the rulers and the ruled. If it were so, such possessions would be a curse and a disgrace to a civilised and free nation. If it were so in India, contented allegiance would there be cowardly corruption, and the highest form of politics would be a permanent conspiracy.

But it is not so. Whatever may be occasionally written or said by rash and irresponsible persons, the heart of this great nation is sound. No Minister in his public despatches, no representative of the people before his constituency or in the House of Commons, would venture to proclaim the doctrine that one penny should be extracted from India beyond the necessary cost of administration, or that any privileges or distinctions, for the benefit of Great Britain or of any class of our population, should be enforced or recognised. But it is highly advisable that the vulgar notions on these heads, so prevalent among our professional

and commercial countrymen in India and those who are instructed by them at home, should be dispelled by a voice of national authority.

If the British people, in their homes and in their Parliament, can only be occasionally roused from utter apathy towards India under the feelings of terror and fury generated by some terrible calamity, if no statesman is to arise who can more truly represent the national spirit and apply the national maxims of Great Britain to our Imperial tutelage than has hitherto been done in practice by our professional delegates in India, the relations between the races, which are now sufficiently unsocial to cause the most painful forebodings, will by degrees become positively inhuman. All the intellectual and emotional force living and moving on that vast continent,—inferior, perhaps, in intrinsic worth and energy, but infinitely superior in volume and in popular affinity to ours,—will gradually be turned from us and against us. At last our military force alone would be left confronted with the physical force of two hundred millions of opponents.

No military force in India can ever be superior, or equal, or comparable with ours. Even without Native auxiliaries, a British army of twenty thousand men would meet with no formidable opponent on the soil of India. But without an immense body of auxiliaries, military and civil, such an army would, at no great distance from the coast, find no subsistence in the soil, and would starve in the midst of plenty. Is it really supposed that the physical force of two hundred millions of people can only be used in fighting? The physical force of India, obstructively exerted, negatively arrayed against us, or merely withheld from our side, would lower us at once from the rank of rulers to that of foreign invaders.

If we persist in trying to make permanent that which is only defensible as a temporary discipline, the emancipation of India from a pupilage which must become intolerable if unduly prolonged, will hardly be delayed, though

it may be accelerated, by our determination, and will come to pass in the fulness of time as certainly as the tree will bear its fruit. The only choice open to us is whether the change is to take place peacefully, harmoniously and with good will, or with ruinous confusion and violence, with misery, calamity and hatred on both sides.

The choice is open to us now, but no one can foretell how long it will remain open. I do not say that the pupilage, from which India has reaped so many blessings, has been as yet unduly prolonged; but I do think that everything warns us to prepare for a critical period of transition. And how that period of transition is to be made a period of more diligent instruction,—how the process of transition can be kept more closely and more firmly under Imperial control, and yet left more freely and confidently to Native direction than has ever been hitherto realised,—except by earnestly and systematically promoting the reform of Native States, and, as they are reformed, by their territorial expansion, I am quite at a loss to understand.

All attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable, and to satisfy the fair aspirations of the ambitious, by the more liberal admission of Natives to the higher branches of the public service, will certainly fail in the desired effect, and, if exclusively relied on, may even be expected, for reasons on which we have already touched,* to stimulate antagonism, and to weaken British authority. The encouragement of education in our own Provinces as well as in the dependent States, and the introduction of well qualified Natives into every department of the administration, are beneficent and necessary measures, and no considerations of national pride or class interest ought to be allowed to obstruct their progress. These measures furnish the medicines and the instruments wherewith to treat the political and social diseases of India, and restore her constituent Kingdoms and nations to a healthy and regular life. They are the means of cure, but are not the cure itself. On the contrary, if not rightly applied they may produce a new and more intractable disease. If,

* *Ante*, p. 43 to 46.

having trained our workmen, we do not set them to work on a sufficiently large and fruitful field, their suppressed energies and talents may find a vent in some very dangerous channel.

Can any unprejudiced and thoughtful observer be so far deceived as to accept the present unnatural form of government for India as if it ought and were to endure for ever? Is that great continent to be ruled and administered for ever by "birds of passage", who have "not the faintest idea of making a home there", whose "main object is to get away from India as fast as possible", and who live in a state of "pecuniary care" that is quite "pitiable" if their income is less than £1500 a year.* Does that system seem calculated or destined for perpetuity, under which, for example, in one of the poorest countries of the world, the Commissioner of a Division, an officer entrusted with no initiative or independent authority, receives a salary about three times as large as that allotted, in one of the richest countries of the world,—France,—to an officer of much higher functions and heavier responsibility, the Prefect of a Department?† Does it seem probable, considering the economical vicissitudes and spiritual convulsions to which nations are liable, considering the growing perceptions, the rising intelligence and the reviving spirit of those who lead and sway that vast population, that the enormous

* *Ante*, p 42, 43.

† The salary of a Commissioner is never less than £3500 a year. I imagine there are few *Préfets* receiving more than 30,000 francs per annum. And yet in Bengal, where in consequence of our thrifless Permanent Settlement the collection of the land revenue is much more easy and simple than in any other part of India, to strengthen the control over the Collectors of Districts exercised by the Commissioners, it is found necessary to have a Board of Revenue sitting at Calcutta, whose members draw salaries of between £4000 and £5000 a year, and are commonly reported to obstruct business. In the Madras Presidency, where the minute subdivision of land renders the collection of revenue much more laborious, there is a Board of Revenue, but there are no Commissioners. In the Bombay Presidency there are two Commissioners, but no Board. But it would never do to diminish the number of prizes for the Bengal Civil Service, more especially of that class of prizes that can be safely conferred upon those meritorious gentlemen of long service whose abilities and activities have always been manifestly mediocre.

remittances now required for disbursement in London, amounting to eleven millions a year, nearly a quarter of the annual revenue of India in these prosperous days, will always be provided without a struggle and without a murmur?

There was great exultation lately, and on very good grounds, when the Rajah of Puttiala was known to have invested forty lakhs of rupees (£400,000) in the Indian funds. The Rajah of Dhar, whose whole revenue scarcely exceeds £50,000 a year, now holds £40,000 of Government paper. The *Friend of India*, fairly representing the average official opinion of Calcutta, justly observed of the Puttiala Rajah's purchase that there could be no more satisfactory pledge and bond of loyalty and good behaviour, and that such transactions ought to be encouraged to the utmost. There can be no doubt of it. We ought not only to encourage Native Princes to make investments of this description, but we ought to induce them to cancel by payment or to take upon their own shoulders, some portions of the Public Debt. The stipulated consideration for the territorial cessions recommended as the motive power of our future Imperial policy, should be partly exacted in this form.

For to any calm and dispassionate inquirer, not afraid to scan the dark as well as the bright side of affairs, the Debt of India presents a strange and portentous aspect. It now amounts to a hundred millions, and the annual interest is upwards of five millions sterling. It is like no other Public Debt that has ever existed. It has been contracted without the authority or approval of any Native Sovereign or of any Native representative body,—a matter to be passed over at present, perhaps, with levity or derision, but which may not always deserve such treatment. It is not in Native hands, but in the hands of English capitalists. Only a fraction, a fluctuating and, I believe, a decreasing fraction, is held by Natives, rather for purposes of speculation than of investment.

It behoves the statesmen and the taxpayers of the United Kingdom to reflect most seriously on their own contingent risk with reference to all Indian securities.

Successive Secretaries of State have, it is true, protested that this country will not guarantee, either in a strictly legal or in a loose commercial sense, the payment of principal or interest of Indian Debt. It is a burden, they say, that India must bear herself, just as Canada and Australia bear theirs, for whose debts Great Britain is no more responsible than for those of the United States or other foreign Governments in which our subjects have largely invested.

It is a burden that India must bear. There is this difference between the several cases, that India must be *made* to bear the burden,—she has no choice in the matter. It is an unmitigated burden to the Indian population, no class deriving any profit from its existence. A large proportion of the Public Debt of Australia, Canada, and the United States is held by their own citizens, forming an influential class upon whom repudiation would inflict great loss or total ruin. But the Native holders of Indian Debt are so few in number as not to constitute a class at all. Thus, instead of the Debt of India being really National, and constituting a bond of mutual obligation and confidence between the Government and the most powerful classes of the country in whose name it is borrowed, it is only a bond of mutual obligation between the British Government of India and a certain class of British investors.

The system of open loans which the Emperor Napoleon III introduced into French finance, and by which he succeeded in tapping the hoards of the middle class and even of the landholding peasantry, may well have strengthened his dynasty and Government; for all the holders of public securities, a large and influential body of taxpayers, thereby became directly interested in maintaining general tranquillity, in upholding their debtor and legalising his rule. But neither the open loans of Calcutta, nor those negotiated on the London Stock Exchange, can have tended in the least to strengthen our Government. No class of taxpayers has thereby become interested in maintaining tranquillity, or in confirming those transactions. On the contrary, the whole body of taxpayers is directly

interested in repudiating them. Both general taxes and local rates have increased of late, and are increasing. These new imposts, for the most part direct in their incidence, are very distinctly felt. As diffused education and more frequent communication with the outer world, create a political consciousness in India, the Natives will ever have before them a very simple motive to dislike us, when they understand not only that we incurred the Debt, not only that we have imposed new taxes to pay the interest, but that our people hold the Debt, and that the interest (or as they will say, the produce of the new taxes), is annually abstracted from India to Great Britain, with other large remittances, for the benefit of the British Government and people.

Still, it may be insisted, even if we suppose that a feeling somewhat more bitter than the usual ignorant impatience of taxation may at some time or other be roused in India with regard to these payments, if we imagine the most alarming possibilities,—general distress, widely extended insurrection, foreign sympathy and intervention, battle, murder, and sudden death,—if we agree with you that the Indian Debt and Indian Railways may not be always quite as safe as Consols, it will not the less remain perfectly true that the British Government does not guarantee those investments, and that people who lent their money, trusting solely to the credit and resources of the Indian Government, have no more claim on the British Exchequer than the unguaranteed creditors of a British Colony or of a foreign State. But it seems doubtful whether such a claim could be so summarily dismissed.

The Canadian and Australian loans were raised under laws passed by local representative bodies, in which the Colonial revenues and resources are pledged to the payment, the Home Government not interfering at any stage to sanction or confirm. The Indian loans were raised partly by the absolute fiat of an Executive appointed by the British Government and all of whose acts are subject to the approval of a Cabinet Minister, latterly under the special rules and conditions prescribed by the British Legislature, the Indian Government being forbidden to

borrow in the London market without an Act of Parliament. It is not very wonderful if unwary investors have come to look upon the commands of the Crown, under which Indian wars have been carried on,—for example, the Afghan War,—and the Acts of the Legislature, under which Indian loans to pay for those wars have been contracted, as coming very near to a British guaranty. If, in default of payment through the ordinary channel, they should consider themselves at least as much entitled to some compensation from the national treasury as were, for instance, the sufferers from the Cattle Plague, we could not be much surprised, and could not blame them severely.

Forty millions, the cost of suppressing the Sepoy Rebellion, were borrowed in London in 1857 and 1858 on tolerably easy terms. Admitting that there is no express Parliamentary pledge for either principal or interest of the Indian Debt, it can hardly be doubted that if at any future crisis there should be less alacrity to supply funds for warlike operations in India, the Home Government would have to come to the rescue in some form or other. The Government of India has hitherto found no difficulty in raising money in the European market; but if the political phenomena of Hindustan were again to assume a threatening aspect, an Imperial guaranty might be absolutely required to restore the waning confidence of capitalists, and to save the Indian Exchequer from ruinous exactions. We should then be in for it beyond all retreat, and the next step—as the simplest financial transaction, to save time and mitigate the terms,—might be to raise our own money, and to advance it to the Indian Government, in the hope of being ultimately repaid.

Forty millions were added to the Indian Debt in two years of insurrection, between June 1857 and June 1859. Who can tell what another insurrection would cost? It cost us two hundred millions to lose America. What would it cost us to keep or to lose India?

The Imperial Government may not be legally or formally responsible for the liquidation of Indian securities, but

assuredly it is so far morally answerable, that any intermission in the punctual solvency of the Government of India would be most damaging to Imperial credit. The less, therefore, that there is of capital and interest for which we can be held answerable the better for us. Whether we firmly abide by our previous refusal, or whether we at last consent to give a decided guaranty, we should insist on every measure being adopted for the decrease of Indian Debt. If it is not positively curtailed, its growth will not be checked.

The most efficacious measure—the only practicable measure on a large scale,—for the financial relief of the Paramount Power in India, and for the moral release of the Imperial Government, is that of reducing our civil and military establishments, contracting the territories under our direct administration, and promoting self-government by the enlargement of Native States. The burden cannot be shaken off,—it must be shifted. And this is the only way to do it. We cannot, as in France, tap the hoards of the middle class and of the thriving peasantry,—they can employ their money to greater advantage in their own occupations, and obtain much larger interest in their own neighbourhood. But we can tap the hoards and forestall the savings of Native Princes by the legitimate and irresistible temptation of territorial and political aggrandisement.

And thereby, as already shown, we can dispel prejudices and enforce reform, improve our military position while diminishing the number of British troops, and establish a most powerful conservative interest in every State, each balanced against each, incapable of combination, but separately connected with the Paramount Power by precise ties of allegiance and service. The Indian Empire would become a living organism instead of being a mechanism. The Statesman and the Viceroy would then have some scope for Government, instead of wasting their energies on the incessant fuss and fidget of extravagant and inappropriate administration.

To reconcile the just and growing demands of educated and experienced Natives with the very natural claims and

expectations of our "Services", is an insolvable problem. It is useless to strive after a hybrid and insincere amalgamation. Any compromise must of necessity be unstable and untenable. We have to choose between the coercive centralisation of a continent, or the local self-government of nations and languages. The choice lies before us,—to move steadily and deliberately towards a future of freedom and progress, or to drift blindly along towards a future of animosity and confusion

APPENDIX:

(A.)

PALATIAL BARRACKS.

(Page 3.)

“It is impossible sufficiently to condemn the authorities who fixed upon the present site of the main frontier post in the Valley of Peshawur, containing so large a force as ten or twelve thousand men of the three arms, more or less.

“The cantonment having been once commenced upon, it was gradually and inconsiderately augmented, enormous sums were expended; and the quarters for troops became not only extensive but were unnecessarily costly. To abandon, should it be found expedient, a large portion of such a station, where millions of money had been expended, was next door to impracticable.

“The author does not hesitate to state here, as he has for many years officially recorded, that the system of building costly and permanent barracks for our European soldiery in India, is the worst that could possibly be adopted. In nine cases out of ten we have taken root, as it were, in localities which have proved to be objectionable. Nothing could be more unwise or injudicious than the hasty decision that has been arrived at in such matters; and the permanent barracks are the source of great evil, and of endless embarrassment.

“The author can never admit, and never did admit, that permanent barracks, even in well-selected localities in these newly-acquired territories, are advantageous to the troops. The temporary buildings of mud and thatch are vastly cooler, and are generally preferred by the soldiers themselves. The temporary buildings will last seven years, and it is very desirable for the health of the troops that the ground should be occasionally shifted. All that is really wanted is a standing camp, covered in sufficiently, and no more, to save the troops from the effects of the climate. The Engineer Department, taking a professional view of the question as to which system should be preferred, de-

cided, as may well be imagined, that permanent buildings would be the cheapest in the long run, and so the Government went headlong into the mischief.

"Now at this moment in the Punjaub, and in the Cis-Sutlej Territories, there are several most extensive permanent cantonments, which are not only of no value in a political point of view, but are positively injurious to the troops themselves. This is an admitted fact; some of these stations are unhealthy in the extreme, but they have cost millions of money, and on that account only cannot be abandoned.

"Meenmeer, near the Punjaub capital, has proved to be the very hot-bed of sickness.

"Nowshera, in which is a set of the very best built and finished barracks in the world, is not only unhealthy but positively dangerous.

"Peshawur cantonment is probably one of the most unhealthy places in the world, and it contains quarters for three or four thousand European troops.

"All over India the troops are now suffering from being permanently fixed in places where they ought not to be, simply because the costly palaces that have been built for troops cannot be thrown away."*

"It is being found that the boasted scientific excellencies of these extravagant barracks are theoretical rather than practical. The Umballa paper thus brings out what seems a fatal defect in their plan:—'The new barracks at that station are no more approved by their inmates than those at Allahabad; the upper storeys are said to be intensely hot. The truth seems to be, that the structures have been designed on such a magnificently extensive scale as regards cubic feet of air per man, that the walls and roofs have insignificant cooling power, or power for the prevention of the generation or access of heat within, and that there is not so much difference as there should be between the temperature of the internal and external atmosphere.'"[†]

From the *Times of India*, October 30th, 1869:—

"The cost of housing European soldiers is becoming excessive; for instance, a barrack calculated to accommodate fifty men only, has lately been completed at Poona at a cost of one lakh and a half of rupees, £15,000, or at the rate of £300 per man. There are few bungalows available for officers that have cost more than rupees 3,000, or £300."

"The upper-storied barrack is a great mistake, the men prefer the lower to the upper rooms at all times; and during the hot months the

* General Sir Sydney Cotton's *Nine Years on the North-West Frontier of India* (Bentley, 1868), p. 60, 61.

† *Times of India*, extracted from *Homeward Mail*, December 6th, 1869.

upper rooms are quite uninhabitable. Buildings that afford sufficient protection from the sun, with means and appliances for cooling them, comprise all requisites; but the palatial barracks that have of late been constructed, are not one whit more healthy than those constructed in a less expensive and less pretending style, nor are they more appreciated by the occupants.

"Those who live in palaces can no more stave off epidemics than those who live in less humble abodes, and for ordinary protection, the inexpensive barrack will always prove as salubrious as the palatial one."

We have had an abundance of melancholy proof during 1869 in the North-West Provinces that our scientifically constructed barracks afford no protection against cholera.

The following extracts of a letter to the *Calcutta Englishman* are taken from the *Times of India*, of the 22nd of May, 1869 —

"Gwalior, as most of your readers, I dare say, are aware, has been selected as one of our principal military centres

"An enormous expenditure is being incurred, both at Morar and in the fortress, on the new double-storeyed barracks for the European soldiers.

"Morar is a notoriously unhealthy station. In ordinary years fevers are rife, and when epidemics, such as small-pox or cholera, appear, they seem to get a lending hand from the atmospherical peculiarities of the place; just as in agriculture certain plants are found to thrive more luxuriantly on some soils than on others.

"The fortress at Gwalior stands on a large isolated rock, about three hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country. The plateau contains an area considerably under one square mile, although it is upwards of a mile in length from end to end.

"Both here and at Morar during the hot months of the year, the register of a thermometer will show an intensity of heat throughout the twenty-four hours. Night brings no relief, for the surrounding low hills and rocks, in which iron ore is the chief element, give out through the hours of darkness the broiling heat which they have absorbed in the day-time. Some of these low hills are situated close to the sites on which, at Morar, new barracks are being built. A locality more unsuitable for the habitation of Europeans, it would have been difficult to discover all over India.

"Tradition has it that the new Artillery lines are built on the site of a village which was deserted many years ago, on account of the constant breaking out of cholera. It might be worth while to make enquiry into the matter, especially as the large majority of cases of cholera, which has lately visited us, and killed upwards of twenty Europeans, was amongst the Royal Artillery. It is said that the visitation was not of a very severe type, and if this be the case, it is awful to contemplate what the extent of mortality may be whenever the worst form of the epidemic may appear at Morar.

"The mortuary return and statistics of health for the last two or three years may have been favourable. And on the strength of these, large building operations are being carried on. But it is well-known

that a dense population offers the least resistance to the ravages of epidemics, and it must be borne in mind that for some years to come the full garrison cannot be stationed at Morar. It has, in fact, to be increased by a whole Regiment of European Cavalry and one of Infantry, and there can be no doubt that the cantonment boundaries enclose an area too contracted for the occupation of so large a force in so unhealthy and hot a climate.

"It is melancholy to think, that with all our vaunted improvement in the science of sanitation during the last ten years, such a terrific blunder should have been perpetrated as that of laying out a cantonment for so large a force within such insufficient space as is available at Morar.

"Experience of the past has shown that when a certain rate of mortality is reached stations must be abandoned. Such was the case many years ago with Kurnaul, and such, it is confidently predicted by many, will be the case again with Morar. But before such a desirable consummation is attained, millions of money will have been spent in carrying out the experiment of massing European soldiers in one of the hottest and most unhealthy spots in India, and thousands of our countrymen will have fallen victims to the obstinate folly and short-sightedness of our rulers."

(B.)

MOBILISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

(Page 3.)

A military correspondent of the *Times of India*, under the signature "Chiharch", writes —

"I believe that the Native army is the question of the day, and the great difficulty with which the Government of India has to contend.

"I have much faith in the late General Jacob's principle of localising Native corps. Each Regiment should have its home, where its families, its aged soldiers, and its pensioners, might take root, and whence they would not be called upon to move. But do I propose that Regiments are to settle down in their home and never leave it till the alarm of war calls them forth? Certainly not. My notion is that the best way to keep the army of India, British and Native, in perfect readiness for service, and at the same time to impress the people with a sense of our military power and alacrity, is not expensively to rear palatial barracks in the burning plains, and more expensively to keep British soldiers in them, but to organise field forces and flying brigades, and keep them moving about the country so long as the weather would permit it to be done with safety. Each Native Regiment should form part of such a force once in three or four years. It would march with the least possible encumbrance, and be prepared to go to any part of India. Manœuvring and military operations of every description would of

course be practised, and every commander of a column would have some definite scheme prescribed to him by the Commander-in Chief which he would be required to carry out, its subordinate detail being left to his own judgment. This would constitute an excellent school for generalship, and both for officers and men would be the best kind of military training. Such is the mode in which I would propose to deal with Native troops in quarters and in the field.

"There would be no such thing as relief of Native Regiments, and the movements of British corps might be so regulated as to make the change from one station to another—let us suppose from Peshawur to Lucknow—an opportunity for exercising with two or more flying columns; the families and details, of course, being sent separately to their destination."

"As a set-off against the expense attending the system of mobilising the Army of India, the great diminution of numbers it would render possible must be considered. Is it too much to say that it would enable reduction to be made to the extent of £4,000,000 to £5,000,000 on our present expenditure?"*

I have no doubt that a reduction in our monstrous military expenditure—now grown to upwards of sixteen millions a year,—to a much greater extent than is contemplated above, might be made, if some such plan were adopted, combined with the great tactical change recommended by a very able and accomplished soldier,—too young of course to be listened to!—Colonel Sir Henry Havelock, now Deputy Quartermaster-General at Dublin, that of converting nearly all the British Infantry in India into Mounted Rifles.†

The letter of "Chiliarch" is particularly satisfactory to me, and I feel myself justified in thus appropriating it, because two years before its publication I had proposed the same system, with this essential difference that, according to my views, Native troops should be "localised", and a "home" found for each corps in the hot season, by nearly all of them being converted into Auxiliary troops belonging to Native States.

"My opinion is that if we make the Native Princes trust us, we can always trust them. Their troops, properly equipped and disciplined, *occasionally brigaded in camps of exercise with the moveable columns which*

* *Homeward Mail*, December 6th, 1869.

† *Three Main Military Questions*, Longmans, 1867. The author—personally unknown to me—describes the remarkable effect produced in many campaigns, especially in the American Civil war, by Mounted Infantry, but with a graceful modesty that we may admire and regret at the same time, abstains from any allusion to his own exploit in 1858 with a very small force organised by himself and mounted on every sort of available animal, against the rebels under Kooer Sing and Omer Sing in Behar. I wish I could tell the story myself as I heard it told by a gallant officer of the Bengal Engineers.

*should take the place of our subsidiary divisions and garrisons, ought to be a source of military strength, and, still more, a visible display of moral strength in our favour, to the great relief of our finances and our muster-roll.”**

Additional testimony to the fact that Native States *can* furnish efficient Auxiliaries is to be seen in the following extract of a letter, dated 3rd of April, 1869, from a correspondent of the *Bombay Times of India*, at the Viceroy's Camp at Umballa during the visit of the Ameer Sher Ali of Afghanistan. It will also be observed that, with the usual official tendency, the writer considers that the little army of the Puttiala Rajah is much *too* efficient.

“While on military topics, your correspondent may as well say that the evident efficiency of the portion of the Maharajah of Puttiala's troops here just now, is such, that were the Force of that Chief as numerous as that of Scindia, it would have to be similarly reduced by order of the Government of India. They are the best uniformed and altogether most serviceable Native State troops that your correspondent has seen. The men are well-statured, and for the most part Sikhs, men who, in open fight on the plain, would ‘lick’ three times their number of Affghans, and whose fathers did so. Returning to their lines from a distant parade, they march ‘at ease’ as all soldiers are allowed to do when there are miles to be got over, but they, nevertheless, seemed quite capable of great precision of alignment and movement, were the word ‘attention’ to be given. The horses of the Cavalry were well-sized and capable of work. The guns were of Government foundry manufacture, and not old, well carriaged and horsed. A European gentleman, who sold out of one of Her Majesty's Regiments, is, I believe, Commandant of the Force”†

A higher and more uniform standard of organisation and discipline could easily be maintained under Imperial inspection, and by means of camps of exercise.

(C.)

THE LITTLE STATE OF DHAR.

(Page 21.)

The following extracts from a leading article in the *Bombay Times of India*, of the 21st of December, 1869, give a pleasing picture of the young Prince of Dhar.

“Some weeks back we drew attention to the continued distress in Rajpootana, more especially with reference to the orphan children whose hard fate still claims the active sympathy of the Indian com-

* *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, pp. 332-3.

† *Times of India*, 10th of April, 1869.

munity everywhere In mentioning various measures which had been taken towards mitigating the distress, we stated that the Dhar Chief had set aside a considerable sum of money for the establishment of an orphanage which was maintained at Erinpoorah under the oversight of the Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana.

"It was in the course of conversation, now some three months back, with Major J. Cadell (at present acting as Bheel Agent) that the subject of the Rajpootana distress was brought before His Highness of Dhar. His interlocutor had scarcely finished describing the classes most in need when, with the promptitude and silent dignity befitting a Prince, three bags, each containing 2,000 rupees" (£200) "were placed at the British officer's feet, in aid of the famishing Marwarries and Rajpoots.

"The surplus funds of the little State of Dhar cannot be very large; but such portions of them as are devoted to charitable purposes appear to be laid out with some judgment. In addition to the 6,000 rupees" (£600) "disposed of as above mentioned, His Highness not long ago appropriated 2,500 rupees" (£250) "to the building of a refuge for lepers—a purpose which some charitable soul in or near Bombay might do well to imitate. But the Dhar Chief not only built the lazar house, he has set aside 10,000 rupees" (£1000) "to be invested in Government paper, for the maintenance of the luckless inmates of the refuge.

"We know nothing of the Dhar Chief except through his brief, eventful political history; but we are glad to have an opportunity of placing his benevolent actions in their proper light. It is also not un-instructive to note that to other Chiefs in Central India his example of wise giving, is one clear gain from the act of political justice which, in the restoration of the Dhar Raj, Lord Stanley and the Home Government carried through against the determined opposition of the Calcutta Foreign Office."

Lord Stanley, there can be no doubt, would frankly admit that without the persistent vigilance and clear expositions of Mr. John Dickinson,* who has for many years applied himself to Indian reform as a study and a pursuit, as other men apply themselves to entomology or astronomy, he would never have been sufficiently well informed on the facts and merits of the Dhar question to have baffled "the determined opposition of the Calcutta Foreign Office". But for this volunteer interference, the young Rajah of Dhar, who has proved such an excellent ruler, would have been dispossessed and degraded into a pensioner, with no object or career in life open to him except that of a conspirator. As it was, the Calcutta Government, dislodged from their first, succeeded in holding their second position; and a severe penalty, though short of utter extinction, was inflicted on the Dhar State, because a portion of its troops, following the example of ours, had mutinied. We appropriated the district of Bairseca, one-sixth of the Dhar territory

* *Dhar Not Restored*, by John Dickinson, F R A S., etc. (P. S. King, Parliament Street), 1864; and *A Sequel to Dhar Not Restored*, 1865

with a revenue of £10,000, and by granting it to the Nawab Begum of Bhopal, cheaply rewarded that faithful and enlightened Princess at the expense of our innocent Ward.

The whole revenue of the Dhar State in the year 1867-8 was only 528,000 rupees (£52,800), out of which 20,000 rupees (£2000) are paid as a military contribution to the British Government, and yet there was a total cash balance of 506,400 rupees (£50,640) in its treasury, of which 350,000 rupees (£35,000) were invested in the 4 per cent. Government Loan. This, at any rate, is not reckless extravagance or bad stewardship.

(D.)

REFORM BY THE GAEKWAR.

(Page 25.)

“(From our own Correspondent)”

“BARODA, Nov. 16th, 1869

“In continuation of my letter of the 27th October last, I have much pleasure to furnish you with a detailed and faithful account of the further progress of the Widow Marriage cause at the Court of His Highness the Gaekwar. In accordance with the invitation sent to the promoters of Widow Marriage at Bombay to come over to Baroda and discuss its legality according to Hindu law with the Shastris at His Highness’s capital, a party of fifteen gentlemen, including such influential and learned persons as Messrs. Vishnu Parashram Shastri Pandit, Mahadeva Govind Ranade, M.A., LL.B.; Ballajee Pandurang; Wamon Abajee Modak, B.A.; Wittul Narayen Pathak, M.A.; Janardhan Sakharam Gadgil, B.A.; Venayek Trimbac Gole; and Ballajee Narayen Kolatkar, started for Baroda on behalf of the Widow Marriage Association. Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao Hari Deshmookh came from Ahmedabad to join the Bombay party. All were at Baroda by Sunday, the 15th instant, and in the afternoon proceeded to see His Highness and the Dewan” (the Minister) “at Makarpoora, His Highness’s residence. After the formal introduction, His Highness at once expressed to Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao Hari that he was ready to act as the party desired. It deserves to be mentioned that His Highness is extremely affable, and converses freely with his guests as if he were one of their own rank. He offered to call the Shastrees of his Court, and bring them to a face to face discussion with the Bombay party at his Palace under his own supervision, with the Dewan and Senapati Sahib. It was eventually proposed that the

discussion should take place during the next Christmas holidays, when all friends of the Widow Marriage cause could afford to stay for some days at Baroda. His Highness said that the party might consult their own convenience. Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao and his friends were left for an hour to themselves to arrive at some resolution. When the party met again His Highness himself suggested a plan which was most satisfactory to both sides. As the discussion was to be a written one, even if the two parties came face to face, it was suggested by His Highness that written questions should be given by the Bombay party which the Baroda Shastris should answer. These answers would be sent to Bombay. The Bombay party might then write their answer, and the Shastris of Baroda might give their rejoinder. In this manner the whole ground being prepared by writing, in the Christmas holidays both parties should meet at Makarpoora. Neutrals should be named on both sides to pronounce an opinion on the discussion, and His Highness himself with the Dewan Sahib and Senapati Sahib, would be present and pronounce decision on the merits. The plan of His Highness was readily assented to, and it was decided to give the written questions next day. After this, His Highness went into some Shastrical points on which questions are usually raised. He asked whether there were clear authorities for widow marriage after *Saptapadi*; what ritual was to be made use of at the second marriage; who was to give away the girl; and how the *patria potestas* of the father over the girl revived at the death of her husband when he" (the father) "had once given her away? He was satisfied on all these points by Mr. Vishnu Shastree Pandit and others; and it must be confessed that the intelligence in questioning and the quickness of comprehension displayed by His Highness would have done credit even to a learned Brahmin. All the Bombay party will bear witness to the truth of this remark. His Highness had the frankness to express again and again that he was already 'twelve annas'—that is seventy-five per cent.—in favour of widow marriage; that he could not see why little girls who never knew what a husband was should be doomed to perpetual widowhood; that it was the duty of Kings to look to the happiness of females as well as males; and that, as God was the Lord of *all*, not only of males, His laws would not sanction the prohibition of Widow Marriage.

"The interview lasted for more than four hours, at the end of which His Highness insisted on entertaining the whole party at supper, for which he issued orders forthwith. After supper the party saw the Dewan Sahib, where an equally agreeable conversation took place for about an hour. The whole party then returned to Baroda from Makarpoora. Next day (Monday, the 16th) written questions were submitted by the Bombay party,

and His Highness after hearing them read, ordered the same to be forwarded to the ecclesiastical officer of the Court for the replies of the Shastris, and required the original replies to be brought to himself. The questions relate to three subjects, viz. :—widow marriage, early marriage, and foreign travel.

“I hope the above account will interest your readers and the public and will encourage lovers of progress. I have given simple facts, scrupulously abstaining from any reflections except in one or two places where it would have been sheer injustice to His Highness not to do so. The public may draw their own inferences.”—*Times of India*.

(E.)

A POLITICAL “SUNYASSEE”.

(Page 28.)

To those who imagine that political apathy prevails among the races of India, and that even with the stimulus of English education they are incapable of political movements in a progressive direction, the following extract from the Bombay newspaper *Native Opinion*, January 9th, 1870, may prove instructive :—

“We are extremely sorry to have to record the death of a character who, in the present state of our society, may well be styled extraordinary. We refer to the late Anandashram Swamy, who died on the 30th ult at Mandavee in Kutch, revered and regretted by the whole people of that State and of its neighbour of Jamnuggur. The people of Mandavee, we are told, voluntarily closed all shops and business for the day as a tribute of respect to the memory of the deceased, and mourned as if each of them had lost his father. .

“Who was this individual who was thus honoured, and what were the means by which he had enshrined himself in the people's hearts? He was no royal personage, no grandee,—not even a Native of the Province of Kattyawar or of Kutch, where he was held in such singular estimation. He was, however, peculiarly a public man after the fashion of ancient India—a genuine Rishi in short—a character deservedly admired by the educated and blindly adored by the orthodox Hindu. To illustrate this statement it is only necessary to mention such particulars of his life and conduct as could be made known under the rules of secrecy which appear to have been imposed on the performance of all meritorious deeds in former (unlike the present) days.

“The deceased was, we believe, a Native of Bengal, and belonged to a mercantile family of Calcutta. He was possessed of more than average abilities, and had received a good English education. Twelve years ago he gave up the pleasures of the world, and entering one of the monkish orders set out on his travel. What the prime cause of his

renunciation was is not known ; but it is certain that a strong bent for travel and a desire to witness the varieties of human nature was one of the motives to that act. We know nothing of his history until he turned up at Jamnuggur* three or four years ago. From thence he wrote news-letters to this journal, the publication of which led to an inquiry into their authorship. Anandashram Swamy was taken before the Jam. He freely admitted the charge, and expressed his determination to persist in the course of exposure so long as His Highness permitted the people entrusted by Providence to his care to be oppressed. For a time he was imprisoned ; but compunction came over the Jam, who ordered the release of the holy and disinterested man, placed himself under his advice, and asked him virtually to undertake the management of his affairs. This he refused, but agreed to procure for the Jam a man qualified for the task morally and otherwise. An advertisement was then given to the papers inviting applications for the place, subsequently Mr. Venayek Narayan Bhagwat, then connected with the management and editing of this journal, accepted the post, and with the advice of his spiritual guide and temporal head introduced those reforms in the government of Jamnuggur some few of which took deep root, but which brought about the fall of the reforming party. This is the truth which Dr. Norman Macleod seems to have got hold of, and with his usual felicity arranged into the following anecdote.

“I may take this opportunity of giving another instance of the indirect influence of English education. A Rajah of a small Principality in the West had had transmitted to him some severe articles, written in English, which had appeared in a Bombay Native paper, exposing grievous errors in his government. Irritated at the exposure, he employed spies to detect the writer. A *Sunyassee* was brought before him as the offender. To a Native Ruler such a charge against such a man seemed absurd. It was very much as if an Irish tinker had been accused of writing articles in the *Times* against Lord Derby. Yet the ascetic, with little clothing, and no ornament except ashes, claimed the articles as his, and proved his right to do so. On being questioned, he said,—‘I was educated in a mission school. I did not see it to be my duty to become a Christian, but chose to remain a devotee to my own religion. As such I journey through the country examining into and exposing all that is false, cruel, and unjust, and giving my support to whatever is good wherever I find it ; and thus I shall continue to do.’

“‘I make you my prime minister!’ exclaimed the wondering Rajah.

“‘I refuse the post,’ replied the Sunyassee, ‘for I have this other work given me to do. But I can get you as good an adviser as myself, and one who has been educated like me.’

“He accordingly sent to his friend the editor of the paper for a prime

* Or Nowanuggur, one of the petty States of Kattyawar, the revenue of which is about £60,000 per annum. The Prince of a Rajpoot family, is styled the Jam.

minister to the Rajah, while he himself went on his lonely way to fulfil his calling in the name of that truth and justice which he had been taught at the mission school."

"The old Karbharees were alarmed at the blow aimed at their personal interests by the changes, and combining began to work upon the pliant Jam. They soon found a subject suited to the occasion. The Jam was anxious to have a child of his by a Mahomedan concubine recognised as his successor. Against this step the reform party declared itself with too imprudent an openness. A handle was fairly given to the intriguers to work with. The Swamy was then on a visit to Bombay, and it was represented to the Jam that his object there was to work out the defeat of His Highness's project for the succession. Meanwhile, a foul trick was played to the prejudice of the new minister, and he was told to leave the State forthwith. Thus he did, and what Jamnuggur cast away, the Political Agent at Rajcote willingly utilised into an excellent government official. But to return. The Swamy left Bombay by a steamer and landed at Mandavee in Kutch, where he heard of the *contretemps* endangering his work and undeservedly discrediting his agent. While he was meditating what to do, he was pressed by the Rao of Kutch to repair to his Court. He at last yielded, and it is to his promptings and advice that those nominations of eligible persons and measures of reform in the administration of the State are chiefly due which have been credited to other parties. He was suffering from ill health for some time past and wished very much for a change, but the crisis through which the Kutch Durbar and State is passing prevented him from following his wishes, and he thus fell a victim to his goodness.

"Such is a brief history of this singular character. His moral and political aspirations were those of the educated Native—his life was devoted entirely to their furtherance. He lived on the voluntary charity of the people but like the Rishies of old, he more than repaid it by contributing to their general good. Morning and evening he preached to crowds of men and women the duty of doing spiritual service to God and good to man. At the same time he kept himself informed of all the public news of the State, and of the politics of India and the world. His advice to Native Princes was judicious and firm. He would never consent to their yielding a jot of their just right to the demands of the Political officers of the British Government, but he insisted also on the reform of their administrations as the prime duty and function of their existence. The Government Agency at Rajcote styled the man a 'Political Sunyassce'. May there be many such political characters, and may those who have had hitherto the benefit of their advice, seeing what they have lost, value and cherish it the more. We may remark that in Kutch the Swamy was not less opposed in his endeavours than in Jamnuggur, and he and his agents had often rough paths to travel. But we trust that his shrewd Highness the Rao has now attained to a full appreciation of his position, and that the valuableness and purity of the advice of which he has been deprived will enable him to see the worthlessness of that by which he has been occasionally misled."

(F.)

RAILWAYS AND REVENUE.

(Page 52.)

The following statement of the comparative progress of Irrigation Districts, Railway Districts, and Unimproved Districts in the Madras Presidency, is extracted from the *Homeward Mail*, of the 27th of August, 1869 :—

“Irrigation Districts—Average revenue of Guntoor, Masulipatam, and Rajahmundry, from 1841 to 1845, £470,000, Godavery and Kistna (same districts as above under new names), for 1865-66, £930,000,—an increase of £460,000, or 100 per cent.; capital expended in irrigating above districts, under £750,000; upon which the increased revenue is 60 per cent.

Railway Districts.—Average revenue of North Arcot, Salem, Coimbatore, and Malabar, from 1841 to 1845, £1,034,000, same districts for 1865-66, £1,135,000—an increase of £101,000, or 10 per cent, capital expended on 450 miles of railway in those districts, at £15,000 per mile (including cost of land and interest paid by Government), £6,750,000; increase of revenue on that capital, $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Comparatively Unimproved Districts.—Average revenue of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, Nellore, Cuddapah, Bellary, Kurnool, Madura, Tinnevely, in which districts no Railways have been laid, and only partial Irrigation works, from 1841 to 1845, £1,690,000, ditto for 1865-66, £2,156,000,—an increase of £466,000, or 27 per cent

“But much of this is owing to improved Irrigation, as it is also in the Railway districts; besides which, the balance of working expenses and interest against the Railways in Madras is £148,000 by the last Report, or more than the whole increase of revenue in those districts. There is thus no proof of any increase of revenue at all in the districts on which $6\frac{3}{4}$ millions have been expended, against nearly half a million increase in those on which under three-quarters of a million has been expended on Irrigation works; for it so happens that the districts in which no Railways have been laid have increased in revenue much more than those in which they have been.

“Can we be surprised at the *Madras Athenæum*, of the 27th July, saying: ‘Starvation, disease, and death are reported as prevalent from all quarters, and unless rain speedily falls to an extent that cannot reasonably be expected, we are still only on the threshold of dire calamities that must inevitably follow; save where the great hydraulic works still furnish some supply to adjacent districts, the ultimate results will be appalling beyond description. Had such works been constructed throughout the length and breadth of the country, as Sir Arthur Cotton and numberless pupils of his school have vainly urged for the last thirty years, how different a story should we now have to tell.’”

I need hardly add that nearly all that has been said in the text on the Railway question, has been condensed from the numerous

official and officious writings of Sir Arthur Cotton on the subject, which commencing twenty-five years ago, before one sod of an Indian railway was turned, have stood the test of verification, while the "splendid" Minutes of Lord Dalhousie and the confident expectations of the original projectors, have been falsified and contradicted by every practical result as to travelling, traffic, profits, and effect on the public revenue

(G)

INDIAN FINANCE.

(Page 53.)

From the *Calcutta Englishman*.

"The total deficit during the three years is over five millions and three-quarters, and the average annual deficit has been exactly £1,932,883. These facts are sufficiently startling, but worse remain behind. There has been an *admitted* deficit of five and three-quarter millions, but we regret to be compelled to arrive at the conclusion that there has also been a secreted deficit of three millions more. At the close of 1865-66 we observe that the cash-balances exceeded thirteen and three-quarter millions sterling; at the close of 1868-69 they had fallen to ten millions and a third, and, notwithstanding the recent loan of £2,400,000, we observe that they are still lower than they have been in this month for many years. The total amount abstracted from the cash-balances from 1866 to 1869 amounts to £3,310,000, which, in addition to the acknowledged deficit above shown of five and three-quarter millions, makes the vast sum of £9,108,541, by which the expenditure has exceeded the revenue during the last three years.

"But even this is not the worst. During the same three years the Indian Government has borrowed six and a half millions sterling, of which only three millions have been spent on reproductive works. Between deficits, cash-balances, and loans on non-reproductive works, we have managed to accumulate a deficiency during three years of peace that would do credit even to an Ottoman financier."*

(H.)

(Page 88.)

"If the past of Indian Policy was one of unwarranted and unjustifiable spoliation, what will be, or ought to be its future?"

* Extracted from the *Homeward Mail*, October 30th, 1869.

‘Reform or destroy’ the Native States? Which to choose? There can be very little doubt as to what sort of answer will be given in the present state of public opinion. But Major Bell cautions us not to be over-sanguine in our hope that the fatal policy of annexation has been given up for good by English statesmen. For how hard did the annexationists work for the spoliation of the Mysore State! But supposing that politicians of all parties (including the high-priest of the worshippers of St Dalhousie, the *Friend of India*), have come over to the belief that the preservation of Native States is compatible with the best interests of the Empire, what policy should the British Government adopt in dealing with them? It will not do simply to perpetuate their existence. If the Indian Government have the will, they have the power of not simply absorbing them, or burdening them with ‘cumbrous establishments’ overloaded with English incumbents, to impede their natural growth and free development, and to defeat the purpose of their existence, but of reforming them by active supervision, by a system of check and advice, so as to make them the instruments of ‘preparing the people for self-government’. This, we believe, is Major Bell’s main argument.”—*The Indū Prakāsh*, Bombay, 13th July, 1868.

“As the British Government is responsible for whatever misrule may prevail in Native States over and above that which their subjects voluntarily put up with, it is bound to cure it in compensation, not by violent annexation, but by persuasion and advice, and the recommendation of well-educated and honourable Native officers for employment at Native Courts. The system adopted by Travancore, the Council of Administration instituted at Jeypore, the regularisation of his administration by the Maharajah Holkar, and the reforms introduced at Khetree and in the States of Gwalior and Hyderabad, show that Native Princes are fully amenable to the influence of wise precept and example when only brought to bear on them. These efforts require to be guided by a disinterested and sympathetic agency, until they culminate in Major Bell’s three guaranties of good government:—(1) a separation of the judicial from the executive functions and functionaries; (2) a code of laws; and (3) a limit to the Sovereign’s personal demand on the State revenue. The first two are being adopted generally, the last has been acted on by Travancore for the last few years. It is for our Government to see that its political officers are—which at present they generally are not—men who would zealously, disinterestedly, and patiently bring about this consummation. No other course towards the Native States would command the sympathy of good men, while if this cannot be done, no stretch of the conception of the right can justify any interference with those States.”—*Native Opinion*, Bombay.

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